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THE FEDERAL COURTS' STRUGGLE WITH BURDEN
ALLOCATION FOR REINSTATEMENT CLAIMS UNDER
TBE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT:
BREAKDOWN OF THE RIGID DUAL FRAMEWORK
Michael L. Murphy'
Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)1
after a protracted legislative battle" The Act was Congress' response to
a perceived "demographic revolution in the composition of the U.S.
workforce, with profound consequences for the lives of working men and
women and their families"3 and the aging baby-boom population.' At
the time, the Bureau of Labor of Statistics predicted that females would
comprise nearly two-thirds of the American workforce by 2005 .
Congress concluded that something needed to be done to address the
fact that women's working lives are more often affected by family
caretaking responsibilities than those of men.
J.D. Candidate, May 2002, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 107 Stat. 6 (1993)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1999)).
2. The original bill, of what would eventually become the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, was introduced first by Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), as the
Parental Disability Leave Act of 1985 on April 4, 1985. See H.R. 2020, 99th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1985). Additionally, President George H.W. Bush vetoed two versions of the Act.
See H.R. 770, 101st Cong. (1990) and S. 5, 102d Cong. (1991). President William Jefferson
Clinton signed the final version on February 5, 1993, and the Act became effective for
most employers on August 5, 1993. See S. 5, 103d Cong. (1993). For a detailed description
of the legislative history of the Family and Medical Leave Act, see Donna Lenhoff &
Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward the
Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39, 58-67 (1994).
3. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7-9 (discussing
the demographic changes that warrant passage of the FMLA).
4. Id. at 7 (citing a National Council on Aging estimate that approximately twenty to
twenty-five percent of ihe 100 million American workers have care giving responsibilities
for a parent or other older relative).
5. Id. at 5-6 (estimating that women would comprise 66.1 percent of the American
workforce by 2005). Women's participation in the labor force more than tripled over the
past century. U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Day 2000 - 10 Workforce Facts, ("In 1990,
less than 20 percent of women were in the labor force; by 1999, women's participation had
increased to 60 percent.") at http://www.dol.gov/ocianews/September-
2000/labor.day_2000funjfacts.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2000).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1999) ("[D]ue to the nature of the roles of men and
women in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
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Under the FMLA, an "eligible employee, 7 is entitled to twelve weeks
of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period.8 The unpaid leave can
be taken for the birth of a child,9 for the placement of a child in adoption
or foster care,' ° for the care for a spouse, child, or parent with a "serious
health condition,"" or for the employee's own serious health condition."
If an employee takes leave, an employer is required to maintain benefit
levels.' 3 At the conclusion of the leave period, employees are entitled to
be restored to their former position 4 or to an "equivalent position."' 5 In
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the
working lives of men."). Among Congress' other findings were "the lack of employment
policies to accommodate working parents can force individuals to choose between job
security and parenting," Id. § 2601(a)(3), and that "employment standards that apply to
one gender only have serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against
employees and applicants for employment who are of that gender." Id. § 2601(a)(6).
7. Id. § 2611(2)(A). An "eligible employee" is defined as an employee who has
been employed for at least twelve months by the employer from whom the employee
requests leave under section 2612 of this title and has "at least 1,250 hours of service with
such employer during the 12-month period." Id. "Hours of service" is defined as hours
worked and does not include paid vacation, personal or sick leave, or holidays. See The
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. at 2180, 2186 (1995) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 825.110).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1999).
9. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A). Entitlement under § 2612(a)(1)(A) expires at the end of the
twelve-month period beginning on the date of the birth of a son or daughter. Id. §
2612(a)(2). An employee is not entitled to take intermittent leave or leave on a reduced
schedule unless agreed to by their employer. Id. § 2612(b)(1).
10. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B). Entitlement under § 2612(a)(1)(B) expires at the end of the
twelve-month period beginning on the date of the placement of a son or daughter in
adoption or foster care. Id. § 2612(a)(2). An employee is not entitled to take intermittent
leave or leave on a reduced schedule unless agreed to by their employer. Id. § 2612(b)(1).
11. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). "Serious health condition" is defined as "an illness, injury,
impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves - (A) inpatient care in a
hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a
health care provider." Id. § 2611(11); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (2001). An employee is
entitled to take intermittent leave or leave on a reduced schedule. See 29 U.S.C. §
2612(b)(1.)-(2) (1999).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1999). See supra note 11 (defining "serious health
condition"). An employee is entitled to take intermittent leave or leave on a reduced
schedule. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1)-(2) (1999).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(2) (1999) ("The taking of leave under section 2612 of this title
shall not result in the loss of any employment benefit accrued prior to the date on which
the leave commenced.").
14. Id. § 2614(a)(1)(A) (stating that the employee must be "restored by the employer
to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced"). But
see Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & tves, Inc. 183 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The
fact that Sarno was not restored to his position at the end of that 12-week period did not
infringe his FMLA rights because it is also undisputed that at the end of that period he
remained unable to perform the essential functions of his position.").
15. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(B) (1999) (stating that the employee must be "restored to
an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and
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addition to granting employees these core "substantive rights,"' 6 the
FMLA protects an employee from discrimination or retaliation for the
exercise of any substantive fight under the FMLA.'
7
Courts have interpreted the FMLA as providing two distinct causes of
action.18 The first cause of action is for a denial of a substantive right.
The second type is for retaliation. Both types of claims will be analyzed
separately. If an employer denies or interferes with these rights, an
employee can either file a civil suit directly in any state or federal court
or file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who will in turn
investigate and file charges if deemed appropriate. 9 The FMLA has no
requirement that an employee exhaust her administrative remedies prior
to filing suit."
Like other employment statutes,2' the FMLA is a "hybrid" act.22 First,
conditions of employment"). For the positions to have "equivalent terms and conditions,"
they must be substantially similar in duties, responsibilities, and status. 29 C.F.R. §
825.215(e) (2001). The concept of equivalency also includes the same worksite and shift,
as well as opportunity for bonuses and other benefits. Id. An "equivalent" job is one that
is "virtually identical to the original job in terms of pay, benefits, and other employment
terms and conditions." U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration
Wage and Hour Division, FMLA Compliance Guide, available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/public/regs/ compliance/whd/1421.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2000).
Employers are permitted to accommodate an employee who requests a different shift,
schedule, or position and can offer a promotion; however, the employer is not allowed to
coerce an employee to accept a position against his will. 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(e) (2001). If
an employee is unable to return to work after the completion of FMLA leave, then the
employee is not entitled to restoration to the same or equivalent position. 29 C.F.R. §
825.214(b) (2001); see also Sarno, 183 F.3d at 161.
16. See supra notes 8-15.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1999).
18. See O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir.
2000) ("The FMLA recognizes two types of claims for alleged violations of these
provisions: interference claims, in which employers burden or outright deny substantive
statutory rights to which their employees are entitled, and retaliation claims, in which
employers discharge employees for exercising their FMLA right to leave."); see also King
v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The FMLA establishes
two categories of broad protections for employees. First, the FMLA contains prescriptive
protections that are expressed as substantive statutory rights .... In addition to the
substantive guarantees contemplated by the Act, the FMLA also affords employees
protection in the event they are discriminated against for exercising their rights under the
Act."); see also Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 1998)
("These rights are essentially prescriptive, 'setting substantive floors' for conduct by
employers, and creating 'entitlements' for employees....") (citation omitted).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (1999); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.400(a) (2001).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)-(b) (1999) (detailing filing procedures for individual
plaintiffs and the Secretary of Labor).
21. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1999);
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1999); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1999); Employment Retirement Income
20011 1083
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:1081
the FMLA creates a series of statutory rights that an employer is
obligated to acknowledge.23  Additionally, the FMLA protects
employees from retributive action if they opt to exercise one of these
rights.24 When Congress designed the statutory framework of the
FMLA, it attempted to balance the demands of the economy with
familial needs, while also being mindful of employers' interests.
25
Since the FMLA's enactment in 1993, over twenty million people have
taken leave under the Act.26 This leave has resulted in over 16,500
complaints.2 A sizable percentage of these complaints arose out of the
employer's alleged failure to reinstate an employee to the same or
equivalent position.28 Currently, enforcement of the FMLA is frustrated
by the federal courts' inability to clearly articulate the proper allocation
of burdens of proof for reinstatement claims under the Act. 29  The
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)-(17) (1999); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1999).
22. See Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'I Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
("The FMLA is a hybrid act; first it creates a series of statutory rights for an employee
which 'shall be unlawful' for the employer to violate, then it also provides protection in the
event an individual is discriminated against for utilizing those rights").
23. 29 U.S.C: §§ 2611, 2612,2614 (1999); supra notes 8-15.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(1)-(3) (1999).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1), (3) (1999).
26. President Clinton's Weekly Radio Address (Federal News Service, Inc., Sept. 2,
2000). In a radio address, President Clinton stated that since his Administration "fought
to pass the Family & Medical Leave Act... over twenty million Americans have taken
advantage of [it] to take a little time off when a baby's born or a parent's sick." Id.
27. In a recent study assessing the period from August 5,1993, to September 30, 1999,
the Department of Labor (DOL) stated that "[t]he Wage and Hour Division has
completed compliance actions on a total of 16,509 complaints against employers or alleged
failure to comply with [the] FMLA." Wage and Hour Division, United States Department
of Labor, The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA): 74 Months of Enforcement And
Out (1999). This figure does not include the number of suits that individuals filed directly
in court.
28. Id. In a recent study assessing the period from August 5, 1993 to September 30,
1999, the DOL stated that of the 16,509 complaints filed with the Wage and Hour
Division, approximately forty percent (7,537) related to a refusal to restore to the same or
equivalent position. Id. In the first eleven months of the FMLA, the DOL received 965
complaints under the FMLA. Hank Ezell, Advocacy Groups Argue That Flaws Need
Fixing, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 8,1994, at E4. Of these complaints, 591 were deemed
valid. Id. Of the 591 valid complaints, sixty-five percent involved problems with
reinstatement, twenty-one percent involved failure to grant leave, and eight percent
involved failure to maintain health benefits during leave. Id.
29. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342 (Edward W. Cleary ed. 1972) ("One ventures
the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms,
except its first cousin, 'burden of proof."'). "Burden of proof' is an ambiguous term
encompassing the burden of pleading, the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion. In a typical civil suit, the party with the burden of pleading (plaintiff) carries
1084
The Family and Medical Leave Act
confusion occurs because, although the courts have viewed
"reinstatement" as a substantive right,3" actions claiming failure to
reinstate closely resemble retaliation claims and can be difficult to
distinguish.3" This confusion is exemplified in the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc.32 where the court of appeals
applied a variant of the McDonnell Douglas test 33 to an FMLA
reinstatement claim; an approach normally reserved for retaliation
claims.34
In January 1996, Sandra Rice, a billing clerk for Sunrise Express,
35
injured her right toe.36 The injury forced Ms. Rice to spend one week in
the hospital and one week resting at home.3 ' After authorizing her to
two additional burdens at trial - the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.
The burden of production requires the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence during his
case-in-chief on each element of his claim to overcome a motion for a judgment as a
matter of law (directed verdict). The plaintiff must overcome a motion for judgment as a
matter of law or otherwise suffer an adverse verdict. If the plaintiff overcomes the motion
for a judgment as a matter of law, then it is necessary for the plaintiff to carry his burden
of persuasion in order to gain a favorable verdict. The plaintiff is required to persuade the
trier of fact, usually by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence produced is
sufficient for a favorable finding. See generally id. §§ 336-345; see also CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§ 3.1-.3 (2d ed. 1999); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 190-91 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "burden of going forward," "burden of
persuasion," "burden of producing evidence," and "burden of proof').
30. See Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 1999) ("An
* employee's right to return to the same position after a qualified absence falls under this
category [of substantive rights]."); see also Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151,
159 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The issue is simply whether the employer provided its employee the
entitlements set forth in the FMLA - for example, a twelve-week leave or reinstatement
after taking a medical leave. Because the issue is the right to an entitlement, the employee
is due the benefit if the statutory requirements are satisfied, regardless of the intent of the
employer.").
31. See, e.g., O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th
Cir. 2000) (claiming failure to reinstate, the court noted that "O'Connor's complaint did
not specifically characterize her FMLA claim as either [an interference claim alleging a
deprivation of substantive right or retaliation claim alleging an adverse employment action
for exercising rights under the Act], but rather asserted some nonspecific violation of the
FMLA"). Although the district court concluded that she plead only retaliatory discharge,
the Circuit found that the "record... presented sufficient evidence at trial in support of
both cognizable causes of action." Id.
32. 209 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
33. See infra discussion at notes 99-117.
34. See, e.g., Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that
McDonnell Douglas framework guides review of FMLA retaliation claims).
35. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1010. Sunrise Express hired Ms. Rice in January 1994, and she
was an "eligible employee" as defined by the FMLA. See supra note 7 (defining "eligible
employee").
36. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1011.
37. Id.
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return to work, doctors informed Ms. Rice that her toe would have to be
amputated . After the operation, Ms. Rice remained on leave for an
additional four weeks.
On March 5, 1996, Ms. Rice contacted Sunrise Express to inform them
that she would be returning to work on March 11." On March 7, Sunrise
Express informed Ms. Rice that she would be laid off effective March
11.41 Her employer claimed that, due to its sale in 1995 and the efficiency
gains that resulted, only one of the two billing clerks was necessary."2
Defendant explained that it selected Ms. Rice for lay-off because she
"wasted time taking smoke breaks, playing computer games, and talking
on the telephone" and generally had a less-productive work ethic than
the retained clerk.43  Ms. Rice sued Sunrise Express44 under section
2614(a)(1) of the FMLA for violating her right to be reinstated to her
former position."
After a two-day jury trial before a magistrate judge ,46 the jury returned
a verdict in favor of Ms. Rice. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded the case because it stated the district court misallocated








44. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rice v. Sunrise Express, No. 00-446, at 4 (U.S.
filed 2000). Rice initially sued Sunrise Express, Inc, Sunrise U.S.A., Inc., and the Gainey
Corporation. Id. at 4 n.1. In January 1997, Gainey Corporation, Sunrise's parent
company, merged Sunrise into another affiliated company and moved its operations to a
different city. Id. at 3-4. "Following the merger, the surviving corporation was renamed
Sunrise U.S.A., Inc." Id at 4 n.1. Since Rice was uncertain of the relationship between
the three companies, she initially named all three companies as co-defendants in her
complaint. Id. Rice agreed to sever Gainey from the case prior to trial. Id. "Sunrise
USA remained in the case as a successor corporation of Sunrise Express, Inc." Id
45. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1011.
46. Id. at 1012. A U.S. magistrate judge is a judicial officer of the district court and is
appointed by majority vote of the active district judges of the court to exercise jurisdiction
over matters assigned by statute as well as those delegated by the district judges. The
Federal Judiciary Homepage, Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html#magist, at *3 (last visited Mar. 29, 2001). Duties
assigned to magistrate judges by district court judges may vary considerably from court to
court. Id.
47. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1012. Entry of the judgment was delayed because of questions
about who the proper defendant was. Id.
48. Id. at 1016, 1018. The magistrate judge gave the following instruction: "'a
defendant is entitled to seek to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
1086 [Vol. 50:1081
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In Rice, the Seventh Circuit held that, when an employee claims that
her right to reinstatement under the FMLA has been violated, the
employee bears the burden to establish the right to the benefit. 9 The
panel majority recognized that Congress placed an express limitation on
the right to reinstatement and therefore placed the burden on the
employee. ° In doing so, the majority found that the Department of
Labor (DOL) regulation regarding reinstatement 5' was not intended to
be the agency's judgment of where to place the ultimate burden of proof
in the litigation context, but merely defined the boundaries of the
substantive right created by the Act.52 In contrast, the dissent argued
that the majority too quickly dismissed the DOL regulation that placed
the burden squarely on the defendant in the form of an affirmative
defense." The dissent also objected to the majority's use of a
"McDonnell Douglas-style analysis" in light of the court of appeal's prior
disapproval of such a method.54
Any discussion of the nuances surrounding reinstatement claims under
the FMLA must begin with an appreciation for the development of the
FMLA. Accordingly, this Note first examines the origins and structure
of the FMLA by tracking its legislative history, as well as the DOL's
interim and final regulations regarding an employee's right to
reinstatement. Next, this Note examines the development of the two
separate causes of action supported by the structure of the FMLA -
claims based on the denial of a substantive right and claims based on an
employer's retaliation against an employee for exercising this right - and
how the courts have treated each of type of claim. This Note then
analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions of Rice, including the
dissenting opinion in the circuit's decision denying rehearing en banc,5
and evaluates their reasoning. This Note also evaluates the majority's
employee would have been laid off during the period of her FMLA leave, even if she had
not taken such leave."' Id. at 1016 n.10 (citing R.74 at 21).
49. Id at 1018.
50. See id.
51. See infra note 87.
52. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
53. See id. at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting); see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984) (adopting a test to give deference to a permissible
agency interpretation when Congress was silent on the issue); see generally BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 10.34-.39 (3d ed. 1991). An affirmative defense is
a matter that the defendant may allege to defeat the plaintiff's claim. Procedurally, an
affirmative defense places the burden of pleading, production, and persuasion upon the
defendant. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1271, at 429-47 (1990).
54. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting).
55. 217 F.3d 492, 493 (2000) (en banc).
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use of a McDonnell Douglas-style of analysis; an approach normally
reserved for retaliation claims, for the right of reinstatement under the
FMLA and predicts how this approach will affect future claims under the
FILA. Finally, this Note concludes by discussing the majority's failure
to recognize the affirmative defense established by the DOL regulations,
as well as the dissent's failure to fully recognize the characteristics of the
affirmative defense.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT FRAMEWORK
Since its enactment, the FMLA has been praised for its role in
ushering in a family friendly workplace. The Act has also been
criticized as an overly complex administrative scheme addressing a
relatively straightforward problem. 7 Regardless of one's opinion of the
FMLA, it is important to understand the Act's many facets and be able
to comply with its provisions.
A. Congressional Action
Congress provided strict jurisdictional requirements 8 that determine
the eligibility of both employees 9 and employers ° under the FMLA.
The FMLA establishes a series of substantive rights to which the
employee is entitled as long as he meets the minimum hours-of-service
56. See Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 2, at 57.
57. See Nancy R. Daspit, Comment, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A
Great Idea But a "Rube Goldberg" Solution?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1352 (1994). "Rube
Goldberg was an American cartoonist known for drawing ridiculously complicated
mechanical gadgets." Id. The term "Rube Goldberg" is now defined as "'accomplishing
by extremely complex roundabout means what actually or seemingly could be done
simply."' Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1983
(1986)).
58. See Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank, 223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The right of
family leave is conferred only on employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours in the
previous [twelve] months.").
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (1999); see also supra note 7 (defining "eligible
employee"). In Dormeyer, the Seventh Circuit struck down a DOL regulation (29 C.F.R.
§ 825.110(d)) that allowed an otherwise ineligible employee to be "deemed eligible" if the
employee failed to respond to the employee's request for leave in a timely fashion. 223
F.3d at 583. Subsequently, in Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d
791 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit followed Dormeyer and struck down the same
DOL regulation.
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1999) (stating that an employer is "any person
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or
more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in
the current or preceding calendar year").
1088 [Vol. 50:1081
The Family and Medical Leave Act
requirement for an eligible employer.6' In meeting its stated purpose of
accommodating the employers' interests, however, Congress also placed
limits on these rights.62
The FMLA permits an employee to take twelve weeks of unpaid leave
for various reasons;63 however, the employer may require an employee to
apply any accrued leave to offset all or part of the twelve-week leave
period.64 Additionally, an employer is permitted to require an employee
to certify eligibility through medical confirmation.65 The FMLA also
allows an employer to obtain second and third medical opinions in
certain circumstances.6 The FMLA places a duty on the employee to
give the employer at least thirty days notice when the leave is
"foreseeable," unless notice is not practicable.67 In sum, an employer is
61. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii).
62. See id. § 2601 (b)(3).
63. See supra notes 8-12.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2). "An eligible employee may elect, or an employer may
require the employee, to substitute any of the accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave,
or family leave of the employee for leave provided under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of
subsection (a)(1) of this section for any part of the 12-week period of such leave under
such subsection." Id. § 2612(d)(2)(A).
65. Id. § 2613(a).
66. Id. § 2613(c)-(d). The process for obtaining a second opinion is as follows:
(c) Second opinion.
(1) In general. In any case in which the employer has reason to doubt the validity
of the certification provided under subsection (a) for leave under subparagraph
(C) or (D) of section 102(a)(1) [29 USCS § 2612(a)(1)(C) or (D)], the employer
may require, at the expense of the employer, that the eligible employee obtain
the opinion of a second health care provider designated or approved by the
employer concerning any information certified under subsection (b) of this
section for such leave.
(2) Limitation. A health care provider designated or approved under paragraph
(1) shall not be employed on a regular basis by the employer.
Id. § 2613(c).
The process for a third opinion is as follows:
(d) Resolution of conflicting opinions.
(1) In general. In any case in which the second opinion described in subsection
(c) differs from the opinion in the original certification provided under
subsection (a) of this section, the employer may require, at the expense of the
employer, that the employee obtain the opinion of a third health care provider
designated or approved jointly by the employer and the employee concerning the
information certified under subsection (b) of this section.
(2) Finality. The opinion of the third health care provider concerning the
information certified under subsection (b) of this section shall be considered to
be final and shall be binding on the employer and the employee.
Id. § 2613(d).
67. Id. § 2612(e). In the case of birth or adoption an employee is generally required
to provide the employer with thirty days notice. Id. § 2612(e)(1). When a "serious health
condition" is the reason for the leave then an "employee shall make a reasonable effort to
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not entitled to deny an "eligible employee" leave under the Act;
however, an employer is permitted to take administrative precautions
that ensure that the benefit is not being abused.
Upon returning from FMLA leave, an employee is entitled to be
reinstated to the same or equivalent position.68 However, a restored
employee is not entitled to any right or benefit he would not have
otherwise been qualified for had he not taken leave.69 In other words, an
employee cannot use FMLA leave as a shield if his position would have
otherwise been eliminated in a reorganization or layoff."0
Additionally, the statute provides that an employer shall not interfere
with or deny an employee an opportunity to exercise his FMLA rights.7'
This provision is referred to as the FMLA's "opposition clause.,
72
Moreover, the FMLA contains a "participation clause" that makes it
unlawful to discriminate against an employee for exercising rights under
the FMILA.
73
It is clear from FMLA's legislative history that Congress modeled the
schedule the treatment so as not to disrupt unduly the operation of the employer, subject
to the approval of the health care provider" involved. Id. § 2612(e)(2)(A).
68. Id. § 2614(a)(1). "An equivalent position is one that is virtually identical to the
employee's former position in terms of pay, benefits and working conditions, including
privileges, perquisites and status." 29 C.F.R. § 825.215 (2001).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3) (1999) (stating that "any right, benefit, or position of
employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which the employee would have
been entitled had the employee not taken leave").
70. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (2000) (stating that "[a]n employee has no greater right to
reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had
been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period").
71. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2) (1999).
72. Id. § 2615(a)(2). The "opposition clause" states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for
any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for
opposing any practice made unlawful by this title." Id. (emphasis added). "Broadly
speaking, participation clause protection is narrower (covering fewer activities) but deeper
(more categorically protected), while opposition clause protection is broader but
shallower." WAYNE N. OUTTEN & ScoTr A. Moss, When Motives Are Mixed and the
Actions Are Ultimate: Unresolved Issues In Retaliation Law, ALI-ABA Course of Study
Materials, Course No. VPBO91.9, Sept. 2000.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b). The FMLA's "participation clause" states:
(b) Interference with proceedings or inquiries. It shall be unlawful for any
person to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual
because such individual
(1) has filed any charge, or has instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding, under or related to this subchapter;
(2) has given, or is about to give, any information in connection with any inquiry
or proceeding relating to any right provided under this subchapter; or
(3) has testified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding relating to any
right provided under this subehapter.
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"opposition clause" after the similar clause contained in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964."4 Therefore, both clauses should be similarly
interpreted.75 The legislative history also states that Congress modeled
the FMLA's "participation clause, 76 on an analogous provision of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the FMLA provision should be
interpreted in the same manner. Nevertheless, although Congress
provided guidance regarding retaliation claims under the FMLA, they
failed to provide guidance for resolving disputes that arise as a denial of
substantive rights.78 Ultimately, the DOL and the courts filled the gaps
left by Congress.79
B. Department of Labor Regulations
Congress provided the DOL 120 days to propose interim regulations,
receive comments, and issue final regulations to implement the FMLA.8°
74. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying discussion.
75. See Chaffin v. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding the
McDonnell Douglas test applies to FMLA action brought under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2));
see also Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp 988, 999-1001 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(finding that FMLA's legislative history requires the application of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis to a retaliation claim).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b); supra note 73.
77. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 34-35 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 36-37. The
participation clause of the FLSA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(3) (1999).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999). A plaintiff is entitled to recover liquidated
damages under the FMLA:
[E]xcept that if an employer who has violated section 2615 of this title proves to
the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated section 2615
of this title was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for
believing that the act or omission was not a violation of section 2615 of this title,
such court may, in the discretion of the court, reduce the amount of the liability
to the amount and interest determined under clauses (i) and (ii), respectively."
Id.
Congress did provide guidance for interpreting the FMLA's remedial provisions
by stating that "[t]he Secretary [of Labor] shall receive, investigate, and attempt to resolve
complaints of violations of section 2615 of this title in the same manner that the Secretary
receives, investigates, and attempts to resolve complaints of violations of sections 206 and
207 of [the Fair Labor Standards Act]." Id. § 2617(b)(1).
79. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("The
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created.., program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974))).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1999). Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to
"prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out subchapter I [29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-
2619 (1999)] and this chapter [29 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2654 (1999)] ... not later than 120 days
after the [date of the enactment of this Act]." Id. On March 30, 1993, the Secretary of
Labor delegated authority to the Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards.
Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary for
Employment Standards, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,190 (April 19, 1993).
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On June 4, 1993, pursuant to this statutory authority, the Secretary of
Labor issued interim regulations.8' Regarding reinstatement, the DOL's
interim regulations stated that on return from FMILA leave, an employee
is entitled to return to the same or equivalent position, including
compensation and benefit levels.82
After extending the comment period, 3 the DOL issued the final
regulations under the FMLA on January 6, 1995.84 When the DOL
published its final rule, there were striking similarities with the interim
regulation; however, the DOL did make several modifications and
clarifications regarding an employee's right to reinstatement. First, it
clarified that an employee is entitled to reinstatement even if an
employer replaces an employee or eliminates a former position through
restructuring. 5 Second, the DOL stated that, if an employee is unable to
81. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (June 4,1993).
82. Id. at 31,823. In pertinent part, the interim regulation limiting the right to
reinstatement to the same or equivalent position stated:
An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and
conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed
during the FMLA leave period. An employer must be able to show that an
employee would not otherwise have been employed at the time reinstatement is
requested in order to deny restoration to employment. For example, an employer
would have the burden of proving that an employee would have been laid off
during the FMLA leave period and, therefore, would not be entitled to
reinstatement. If a shift has been eliminated, or overtime has been decreased, an
employee would not be entitled to return to work that shift or the original
overtime hours upon reinstatement. However, if a position on, for example, a
night shift has been filled by another employee, the employee is entitled to return
to the same shift on which employed before taking FMLA leave.
See id. at 31,824 (emphasis added). Moreover, The DOL stated that:
An employee has no greater right to restoration or to other benefits than if the
employee had been continuously employed during the leave period. If the
employee is denied restoration or other benefits, the employer must be able to
show that the employee would not have continued to be employed, or to have
received the benefits, if the employee had continued to work until the time
restoration was requested. For example, the employer may have had a
reduction-in-force, eliminated a shift, or eliminated overtime work. Under such
circumstances, the employee would not be entitled to reinstatement, or to work
overtime hours not available to other employees, if the employee would have
been affected by these changes if not on FMLA leave. If, however, the employee
has been replaced on the night shift by another employee, the employer may not
deny the employee the opportunity to return to the same shift.
Id. at 31,805.
83. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; Extension of Comment Period, 58
Fed. Reg. 45,433 (Aug. 30, 1993). The period for submitting comments was extended from
September 2, 1993 to December 3, 1993. Id.
84. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180 (1995) (codified as
29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(a) (2001); see also The Family and Medical Leave Act of
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perform the essential functions of the position after the FMLA leave
period, then the employee has no right to restoration under the FMLA,
but may have recourse under the American with Disabilities Act
(ADA).86 Finally, the DOL refined the limitations placed on the right to
reinstatement when it issued its final regulations.8"
1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180,2213-14 (Jan. 6, 1995) (DOL's comments regarding regulation).
86. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2213-14 (Jan. 6,
1995) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (1995)) (Final Regulations).
87. Id. at 2254 (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1)-(2) (2001)). In pertinent part,
the final regulation limiting reinstatement states:
(a) An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and
conditions of employment than if the employee had been continuously employed
during the FMLA leave period. An employer must be able to show that an
employee would not otherwise have been employed at the time reinstatement is
requested in order to deny restoration to employment. For example:
(1) If an employee is laid off during the course of taking FMLA leave and
employment is terminated, the employer's responsibility to continue FN4LA
leave, maintain group health plan benefits and restore the employee cease at the
time the employee is laid off, provided the employer has no continuing
obligations under a collective bargaining agreement or otherwise. An employer
would have the burden of proving that an employee would have been laid off
during the FMLA leave period and, therefore, would not be entitled to
restoration.
(2) If a shift has been eliminated, or overtime has been decreased, an employee
would not be entitled to return to work that shift or the original overtime hours
upon restoration. However, if a position on, for example, a night shift has been
filled by another employee, the employee is entitled to return to the same shift
on which employed before taking FMLA leave.
Id. (emphasis added to new language in final rule). The comments published in
conjunction with the rule are as follows:
Section 104(a)(3) of FMLA limits the entitlement of any restored employee to no
greater right, benefit, or position of employment than any right, benefit, or
position of employment to which the employee would have been entitled had the
employee not taken the leave. An employer must demonstrate that the
employee would not otherwise have been employed when reinstatement is
requested to be able to deny restoring the employee (for example, in the case of
a department-wide layoff affecting the employee's former position). Similarly, if
a shift has been eliminated or overtime work has decreased, a returning
employee would not be entitled to return to that shift or to work the same
overtime hours as before. In addition, an employer may deny reinstatement to
an eligible "key" employee if such reinstatement would cause substantial and
grievous economic injury to the employer's operations and if the employer has
complied with all the provisions of section 825.217; and, an employer may delay
reinstatement of an employee who fails to furnish a fitness for duty certificate on
return to work in the circumstances described in section 825.310, until the
certificate is furnished.
The National Association of Computer Consultant Business commented that
while this section referred to the task of the project being completed while an
employee is on FMLA leave and the loss of reinstatement rights in that instance,
it did not refer to other similar limitations, such as where a position is eliminated
or resubeontracted. The same principles would apply in these other instances
109320011
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where the position of employment no longer exists and the change occurs during
an employee's FMLA leave. An employee's rights to be restored are the same as
if the employee had not taken the leave. The employer must establish that the
employee who seeks reinstatement would not otherwise have been employed if
leave had not been taken in order to deny reinstatement. See also § 825.312(d).
Employers Association of New Jersey asked, where an employee would have
been laid off during a period of FMLA leave, at what point does the leave end
and the employee's entitlement to maintenance of group health benefits cease?
Or, where the employer makes a bona fide determination that, because of
reduced workforce requirements, the services of the employee on FMLA leave
will no longer be required? Similarly, Alabama Power Company (Balch &
Bingham) requested more guidance be given on department-wide downsizing
while an employee is on leave-must the employee still be kept on leave for the
remainder of the planned FMLA leave if he or she would have been permanently
laid off when the downsizing occurred? Fisher and Phillips also suggested the
regulations clarify that an eligible employee's rights to group health plan benefits
end after the date of a layoff affecting an employee on FMLA leave. The
National Restaurant Association suggested that it would be helpful if more
examples were included of circumstances where an employee's rights to job
restoration and maintenance of health benefits are limited.
As explained in several sections of the regulations, an eligible employee
under FMLA is entitled to no greater right of employment than if leave had not
been taken. The legislative history points out that if, but for being on leave, an
employee would have been laid off, the employee's fight to reinstatement is
whatever it would have been had the employee not been on leave at the time of
the layoff. Thus, if an employee is laid off during an FMLA leave period, the
employer's obligations to continue the employee on FMLA leave, maintain the
employee's group health plan benefits, and restore the employee to a position of
employment, all cease at the time the employee is laid off provided the employer
has no such obligation under a collective bargaining agreement or otherwise, and
the employer can demonstrate that the employee would not have been
reinstated, reassigned, or transferred in the absence of the FMLA leave. This
section has been so clarified. Note, too, however, an employer is prohibited from
discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee for exercising rights
under the Act, and the employer that eliminates the job of an employee who
takes FMLA leave (for example, by redistributing the work to other employees)
bears the burden of establishing that the job would have been eliminated, and the
employee would not otherwise have been employed by the employer, if the
employee had continued to work instead of taking the leave. (See also the
discussion of § 825.214, above).
Employers Association of New Jersey also asked whether an employer is
obligated to reinstate an employee if, during the leave, the employee engaged in
conduct which would have resulted in discharge if the conduct occurred while the
employee was at work. If no such obligation exists, may the FMLA leave and
maintenance of group health insurance be discontinued at the point in time that
the misconduct took place? Again, an employee on FMLA leave is entitled to no
greater right of employment than if the leave was not taken. Provided the
employer's policies are nondiscriminatory, are applied uniformly to similarly-
situated employees, and violate no other laws, regulations, or collective
bargaining agreements where applicable, sanctions such as discharge for
misconduct may continue to be applied to the employee on FMLA leave for
actionable offenses as if the employee had continued to work.
Id. at 2216.
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The framework established by the final DOL regulation lends itself to
the establishment of an independent affirmative defense.88  An
independent affirmative defense operates to defeat the plaintiff's claim
regardless of the truth of the plaintiff's allegations.8 9
C. Judicial Interpretation
As stated above, Congress was clear in its intent to have the FMLA
mirror the interpretation of other similar statutes that permit a
retaliation claim, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the National
Labor Relations, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.90 However, the
statute is silent regarding how to treat actions claiming a denial of'
substantive rights, such as reinstatement.9 ' The DOL nearly filled this
gap by providing a regulation that states "[a]n employer would have the
burden of proving that an employee would have been laid off during the
FMLA leave period and, therefore, would not be entitled to
restoration." 92 The courts, however, have been hesitant to treat this
language as creating an affirmative defense.
93
88. Id. at 2216. "An employer must demonstrate that the employee would not have
otherwise have been employed when reinstatement is requested to be able to deny
restoring the employee." Id. (emphasis added). "The employer must establish that the
employee who seeks reinstatement would not otherwise have been employed if leave had
not been taken in order to deny reinstatement." Id. (emphasis added). "Thus, if an
employee is laid off during an FMLA leave period, the employer's obligations.., cease at
the time the employee is laid off. . . ,and the employer can demonstrate that the employee
would not have been reinstated, reassigned, or transferred in the absence of FMLA
leave." Id (emphasis added). "[T]he employer that eliminates the job of an employee
who takes FMLA leave.., bears the burden of establishing that the job would have been
eliminated, and the employee would not otherwise have been employed by the employer,
if the employee had continued to work instead of taking the leave." Id. (emphasis added).
89. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 53 and accompanying text. A
recent example of a judicially created affirmative defense can be found in the area of
sexual harassment law. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998);
Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-08 (1998). The Supreme Court ruled that an
employer may be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of an
employee if a prima facie case is established for hostile working environment. Faragher,
524 U.S. at 807. If no "tangible employment action" is taken against the victimized
employee, the defendant "may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject
to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(c)." Id. The
affirmative defense is comprised of two elements: "(a) the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any improper behavior and (b) the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Id.
90. See supra notes 74-77.
91. See supra note 78.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1) (1995).
93. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1012 (2000) (finding that the "regulation is understood as an explanation of the
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1. Analogous Statutes
It has been said that the United States has "no coherent labor relations
system," but instead has a "patchwork of laws and a patchwork of
employer-employee practices that contain scattered elements of a
system, or perhaps even of several systems." 94 It is against this backdrop
that the courts have developed the framework for analyzing FMLA
claims.
a. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Enacted in 1964, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin. 5 Since that time, the
federal courts have developed two theories for proving employment
discrimination: "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact."9
Disparate treatment claims arise when an employer treats persons less
favorably than others because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.97 Disparate impact claims involve employment practices, such as
employment tests and qualifications, that are facially neutral in their
treatment of protected groups but in practice affect one group more
harshly than another.98
A centerpiece of employment jurisprudence is the Supreme Court's
burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.99 In McDonnell Douglas, which involved a Title VII disparate
treatment claim, the Supreme Court developed a three-step analysis that
allocated the burdens of proof between the employee and employer in
discrimination claims based on retaliation.' ° The employee carries the
nature of the substantive right created by statute").
94. Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8
ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 517,519 (1994).
95. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(l)-(16) (1999).
96. Keith R. Fentonmiller, The Continuing Validity of Disparate Impact Analysis for
Federal-Sector Age Discrimination Claims, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1071, 1074 n.15 (citing
BARBARA LINDEMAN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 4 (3d
ed. 1996)). In this article, Fentonmiller stated:
Employment discrimination claims can be broken into four categories: (1)
disparate treatment, (2) policies or practices which perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination, (3) policies or practices having an adverse impact not justified by
business necessity (disparate impact), and (4) failure to make reasonable
accommodation to an employee's religious observance or practices or to a
qualified employee's disability.
Id.
97. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 n.15 (1977).
98. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
99. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
100. Id. at 802-05.
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initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment by
showing that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3)
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant's qualifications.'0 '
Although the Supreme Court developed the prima facie analysis in the
context of an applicant-employer situation, the prima facie showing is
easily adapted to various contexts. °2 Once an employee establishes a
prima facie case, the employer must display a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. 3  If the
employer can do so, the plaintiff is afforded a final opportunity to
demonstrate that the reasons the employer proffered were pretextual. 1
0 4
Subsequently, the Court refined the application of the McDonnell
101. Id. at 802. The Court's formulation of the prima facie case mirrored the Eighth
Circuit panel majority's opinion by not requiring a showing of intent in the prima facie
case. Id. at 802 n.13. "Under the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, [the plaintiff] must
first offer evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation."
Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 442 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Karpel v.
INOVA Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1228 (4th Cir. 1998)). For a thorough
discussion regarding the operation of a prima facie case, see MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 342-345 (Edward W. Cleary ed. 1972).
102. ABA, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION § 1.02[3] (1994)
(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13). In a discharge, failure to promote,
demotion, or reduction in force case, or in a case alleging retaliation for protected
conduct, the instruction must be modified. Id. Although the elements of a prima facie
case outlined in McDonnell Douglas, referred to a hiring case, the Court made clear that
the elements set forth do not establish an inflexible standard, as "[t]he facts necessarily
will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification ... of the prima facie proof required from
respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect in differing factual situations."
Id. The analysis for Title VII retaliation claims is similar to Title VII discrimination claims
when there is not direct proof of retaliation:
A claim for retaliation under Title VII invokes a variant of the familiar
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework requiring the plaintiff to show:
that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; suffered some adverse action by
his employer; and that there exists a causal link between the protected expression
and the adverse action. Once this is shown, the employer has the burden of
producing a valid, non-retaliatory reason for the action. To prevail, the plaintiff
must then rebut the employer's proffered reason by proving that it is mere
pretext for discrimination.
Sanchez v. Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
103. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
104. Id. at 804. The Court stated that pretext may be established by showing that the
employer's justification does not adequately explain the employee's differential treatment.
Id. For a thorough discussion of the ways in which a plaintiff may meet his burden of
persuasion by demonstrating pretext, see Miquel Angel M6ndez, Presumptions of
Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129,
1154-55 n.128 (1980).
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Douglas framework since its decision did not rationalize its deviation
from the typical model of burden allocation in a civil case. 105 In
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, °" a class action
suit against a labor union and employer, the Court stated that:
The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its
specification of the discrete elements of proof there required,
but in its recognition of the general principle that any Title VII
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence
adequate to create an inference that an employment decision
was based upon discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.
0 7
The Court further explained that the prima facie showing required
under McDonnell Douglas, which permits an inference of discrimination
to be drawn, eliminated the need for direct evidence of discriminatory
intent. 108
The Supreme Court found that the prima facie case accords with
common law since "[plresumptions shifting the burden of proof" have
been used historically to "reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and
to conform with a party's superior access to the proof."' 0 9 The Court
justified the use of the McDonnell Douglas approach in disparate
treatment cases because the employer is generally better suited to show
why the employee was denied work."'
Subsequently, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,"' the Supreme
Court continued to refine the burden-shifting approach outlined in
McDonnell Douglas. The Court found that the prima facie showing
merely creates a rebuttable presumption" 2 and should not be confused
with "an ultimate finding of fact as to discriminat[ion]."" The Court
unanimously held"' that the employer is merely required to establish a
105. See supra note 29.
106. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
107. Id. at 358.
108. Id. at 358 n.44 (noting the prima facie showing was adequate to create an
inference of retaliation because it eliminated "the two most common [neutral] reasons...
[for] reject[ing] a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence
of a vacancy in the job sought").
109. Id. at 359 n.45 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 360 n.45.
111. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
112. Id. at 579-80.
113. Id. at 576.
114. Id. at 581.-83 (Marshall, J. dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent was limited to
the majority's foreclosure of plaintiffs disparate impact claim and did not extend to the
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the disputed employment
action," ' and is not required to show the least onerous method of doing
so as urged by the Seventh Circuit." 6 The Court concluded that any
showing greater than a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason would
require a conclusive finding of discrimination prior to trial." 7
Finally, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,"8 the
Supreme Court clarified the evidentiary nature of the defendant's
burden of proof under the prima facie case." 9 The Court found that the
term "prima facie case" established a "legally mandatory, rebuttable
presumption.' 121 Moreover, the majority stated that when the term
"presumption" is properly used, it "refers only to a device for allocating
the production burden."'' 2' The Court reasoned that since the
presumption only shifts the burden of production to the defendant, the
burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff." 1
22
b. The National Labor Relations Act of1935 23
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
popularly known as the Wagner Act, which permits employees to
organize a union and collectively bargain with their employees.'
24
Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees the right to organize or
join a union and to engage in concerted activities, including collective
bargaining.' 2' Additionally, section 8 outlines a series of practices that
are considered "[u]nfair labor practices" (ULP) by both employers 12' andlabor organizations. 27 Specifically, section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA states
majority's holding regarding the disparate treatment theory. Id.
115. Id. at 577.
116. Id. at 574 (rejecting Seventh Circuit's search for a "reasonable middle ground").
117. Id. at 578.
118. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
119. See Bd. of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978)
(per curiam). Previously, the Court stated that the prima facie case does not require the
defendant to "prov[e the] absence of discriminatory motive." Id.
120. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
121. Id. at 255 n.8 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 253.
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994); See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (holding the NLRA to be constitutional).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
125. Id. § 157.
126. Id. § 158(a).
127. Id. § 158(b). Due to the scope of this paper, union unfair labor practices will not
be examined. For a good overview of these practices, the reader should turn to J.
FREEDLEY HUNSICKER ET AL., NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES,
Philadelphia, PA, U.S.A: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School, University of
109920011
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that it is a ULP for an employer to interfere with an employee's rights
under section 7.128 Moreover, section 8(a)(3) states that an employer
may not attempt to interfere with an employee's desire to join a labor
organization. 2' The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is
authorized by section 10 of the NLRA to prevent persons from
committing unfair labor practices. 130  If the NLRB concludes by a
preponderance of the evidence that a person has committed a ULP,
section 10(c) allows the NLRB to order appropriate relief. '3 '
In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,3 2 the Supreme Court
clarified the elements necessary to establish a prima facie violation of
section 8(a)(3), as well as the framework for allocating the burdens of
proof in these types of claims.' 3 To make a prima facie showing of an
Pennsylvania (Rev. ed. 1986).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994). Examples of such activities include:
(1) [t]hreatening to fire for union or concerted activity[;] (2) [t]hreatening to
demote, reprimand, or punish in any way because of union activity[;] (3)
[c]onducting widespread antiunion interrogation[;] (4) [t]hreatening to move to
escape the union[;] (5) [t]hreatening loss of benefits if union comes in[;] (6)
[p]romising benefit to employees in return for antiunion activities[;] (7)
[i]nterfering with communication among employees or with attempts to organize
by such means as unduly restrictive no-solicitation rules[;] (8) [s]pying on union
meetings[; and] (9) [g]ranting benefits or wage increases timed to defeat union
organization.
STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 8-9 (4th
ed., Bureau of National Affairs 1991).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994). Examples of such activities include "[r]efusing to
hire, firing, demoting, or in any way punishing an employee to 'encourage or discourage'
union membership. This section also protects workers from discharge or other
employment discrimination because of union activity." See SCHLOSSBERG & SCOTT,
supra note 128, at 10.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1994).
131. Id. § 160(c). An employee may be reinstated with or without backpay. Id. As
amended in 1947, by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), section
10(c) prohibits the NLRB from ordering the reinstatement of an employee who was
discharged for cause. 93 CONG. REC. 6654, 6677-78 (1947).
132. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
133. Id. at 401-03. The Court's ruling in Transportation Management Corp. came in
response to a split among the Circuits. See JOANNE S. MARCHETrA, Note, NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp.: Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Section 8(a)(3)
Mixed Motive Discharge Cases, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 279, 280 & n.11 (1983). Section
8(a)(3) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided,
That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not
established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an
unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment
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ULP by the employer, the NLRB's General Counsel must prove that the
employee was engaged in protected activity,' and that antiunion animus
was a contributing factor to the discharge.'35 Throughout the action, the
General Counsel retains the burden of persuasion regarding the issue of
antiunion animus.' 6 The Court found that the General Counsel was not
required to prove that the employer's proffered reason for the discharge
was pretextual.137
Additionally, the Court approved the NLRB's treatment of the
or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a)
of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such
agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in
section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such
agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the
employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of
such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, that no
employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for
nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same
terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
135. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 401.
136. See id. ("We are quite sure, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that section 10(c) forbids the burden on the employer to prove that absent the improper
motivation he would have acted in the same manner for wholly legitimate reasons.").
137. By accepting the affirmative defense, the Supreme Court rejected the
requirement that the General Counsel prove that the legitimate business reason was
pretextual. Several lower courts read a "pretext" requirement into the Wright Line
decision. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), where the First
Circuit stated:
Our disagreement with the Board may reduce to this: the Board apparently feels
that the Act is violated by a showing of anti-union sentiment in connection with a
discharge. It would then impose an affirmative defense upon the employer to
negate the violation. In our view, by contrast, the Act is violated only when an
employer with anti-union animus discharges an employee he would not have
fired "but for" the employee's union activity.
Id. at 906 n.12.
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employer's burden as an affirmative defense.' 8 The Court held that
once an employee presents evidence sufficient to establish antiunion
animus then a section 8(a)(3) violation is established. 39  Once the
General Counsel establishes unlawful motive, it is presumed that the
employer has violated the NLRA' 40 If the General Counsel establishes
a violation, the employer may assert a legitimate and sufficient
justification for the employment action.' 4' If successful, the affirmative
defense shields it from any liability for its actions. 42 In doing so, the
Court unanimously affirmed the NLRB's approach, which characterized
the employer's responsibility as an independent affirmative defense,
therefore, rejecting the proposition that the burden of persuasion
shifted. '
4
Procedurally, the affirmative defense placed the burden of pleading,
production, and persuasion upon the defendant.'4 4  The Court
emphasized, however, that the establishment of the independent
138. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 401-03. The Court stated:
The Board's allocation of the burden of proof is clearly reasonable in this
context, for the reason stated in NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872
(2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938), a case on which the Board relied
when it began taking the position that the burden of persuasion could be shifted.
Eg., [In re] Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting, 16 N.L.R.B. [727, 801 (N.L.R.B.
1939)]. The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is
declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly
created the risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by
his own wrongdoing.
Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 403. An affirmative defense is a matter that the
defendant may allege to defeat the plaintiffs claim. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
53 § 1270.
139. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 403.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 401. See infra note 143 and accompanying discussion.
142. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 401.
143. Id. at 401-03. The Court stated:
We assume that the Board could reasonably have construed the Act in the
manner insisted on by the Court of Appeals. We also assume that the Board
might have considered a showing by the employer that the adverse action would
have occurred in any event as not obviating a violation adjudication but as going
only to the permissible remedy, in which event the burden of proof could surely
have been put on the employer. The Board has instead chosen to recognize, as it
insists it has done for many years, what it designates as an affirmative defense
that the employer has the burden of sustaining. We are unprepared to hold that
this is an impermissible construction of the Act. '[The] Board's construction
here, while it may not be required by the Act, is at least permissible under it..
and in these circumstances its position is entitled to deference.
Id. at 402-03 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 402 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975)).
144. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 53, § 1271.
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affirmative defense did not modify the elements the plaintiff must
establish to prove a section 8(a)(3) ULP.'
c. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) established the minimum wage,
set standards for overtime pay, and passed guidelines for child labor.' 6
Regarding the overtime provisions,'47 the FLSA exempts classes of
employees depending on their salary, the type of work, and the amount
of discretion afforded to the employee.'48 Under section 13 of the FLSA,
executives, administrators, and professionals are exempted from the
minimum wage and overtime provisions.'49
In Sutton v. Engineered Systems, Inc.,'ro the plaintiff brought a claim
under the FLSA claiming that he was due overtime pay."' The
defendant claimed that the plaintiff was not entitled to overtime because
he fell under the "executive capacity" exemption. 52 Under the FLSA,
the. employer carries the burden of persuasion to prove that the
exemption applies to the employee in question.'53 In Sutton, the
defendant had the burden of proving that plaintiff was exempt from the
overtime provisions because of a "bona fide executive capacity."' 54 The
145. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 401. The Court explained:
[TJhe Board's construction of the statute permits an employer to avoid being
adjudicated a violator by showing what his actions would have been regardless of
his forbidden motivation. It extends to the employer what the Board considers
to be an affirmative defense but does not change or add to the elements of the
unfair labor practice that the General Counsel has the burden of proving under
section 10(c).
Id. (footnote omitted).
146. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
147. Id. § 207(a)(1) ("Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall
employ any of his employees who... [work] for a workweek longer than forty hours
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours
above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he
is employed.").
148. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.0-541.602 (1993).
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); see also id. § 213(a)(2)-(15).
150. 598 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1979).
151. Id. at 1135. Plaintiff was paid a salary of $1,300 per month with a bonus of ten
percent on any future profits from the project. Id. Ultimately, the project never realized a
profit. Id. at 1135 n.2.
152. Id. at 1135-36.
153. Id. at 1135 n.3 (citing Gilstrap v. Synalloy Corp., 409 F. Supp. 621, 623-24 (D. La.
1976); Lane v. M's Pub, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 917,919 (D. Neb. 1977)). The exemptions under
the FLSA are to be construed narrowly. Sutton, 598 F.2d at 1135 n.3.
154. See Sutton, 598 F.2d at 1135; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (including "any
employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional
capacity..."). "Executive capacity" is defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1993). Under the
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Eighth Circuit found that defendant had met its burden to prove the
exemption; the employee did not receive overtime pay."'
The FLSA also contains a provision prohibiting employer retaliation.
Under section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA, it is unlawful for an employer to
"discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to
be instituted any proceeding under or related to [this Act]."' 56 Courts
have held that FLSA retaliation claims are subject to the burden-shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.'5 7 To establish a retaliation
prima facie case under the FLSA, the plaintiff must show that he
engaged in protected activity, he received an adverse action, and that the
adverse action was the result of plaintiff engaging in that protected
activity.'58 Under the FLSA, an employee can only make a retaliation
claim if the employee has previously asserted statutory rights,' even if
the provisions of the FLSA do not cover the employee. ,60
2. Court Action
Since its creation, courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting approach in several contexts. Consistent with this record, the
courts have applied the approach to the FMLA.
regulation, the employee is deemed to have met the requirements if the employee makes
more than $250 per week, and "the employee's primary duty consists of the management
of an enterprise in which employed or of a customarily recognized department or
subdivision thereof and includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or
more other employees therein." 29 C.F.R. § 541.119(a) (1993).
155. Sutton. 598 F.2d at 1137.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1988).
157. See, e.g., Larsen v. Club Corp. of Am., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. I11. 1994)
(stating that a plaintiff alleging retaliatory discharge under § 215(a)(3) of the FLSA may
proceed using either the mixed motives analysis, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), or the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach); Marx v. Schnuck Mkts.,
863 F. Supp. 1489, 1494 (D. Kan. 1994) (stating that a court may apply the burden-shifting
analysis of McDonnell Douglas when analyzing FLSA retaliation claims); Hashop v.
Rockwell Space Operations Co., 867 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating that to prevail
on FLSA retaliation claim, plaintiff must prove the same elements that would be required
for Title VII).
158. See, e.g., Blackie v. Maine, 888 F. Supp. 203 (D. Me. 1995).
159. See, e.g., James v. Medicalcontrol, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 749,752 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
160. See Legutko v. Local 816, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 606 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding that regardless of the merits of the substantive claim under FLSA, an
employee can sustain a retaliation claim); Nairne v. Manzo, No. 86-0206, 1986 WL 12934,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that although the employee was exempt from FLSA's
overtime provisions, a material fact is raised regarding her discharge).
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a. Tenth Circuit Applies McDonnell Douglas Approach to FMLA
Retaliation Claim
In Morgan v. Hilti, Inc.,"' the Tenth Circuit held that for retaliation
claims under the FMLA, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test
controls.12  In Morgan, the plaintiff brought an action claiming
retaliation for exercising her rights under the FMLA' 63 Defendant
denied that it engaged in any illegal conduct and maintained that
plaintiff's excessive unscheduled absenteeism was the sole reason for its
actions. '4
Although the plaintiff established a prima facie case of
discrimination,"6 5 the court stated, "[e]ven though all doubts concerning
pretext must be resolved in plaintiff's favor, a plaintiff's allegations alone
will not defeat summary judgment.' ' 66 Since the plaintiff was unable to
show pretext, summary judgment was proper."'
161. 108 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997).
162. Id. at 1323 (citing Williams v. Widnall, 79 F.3d 1003, 1005 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1996)
("[E]xplaining application of the analysis in cases arising under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791."); Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp
988, 999-1001 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("[A]pplying the analysis to an FMLA retaliation claim
after a review of FMLA legislative history.")). Further, the court noted:
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is appropriate in disability
discrimination cases such as the present one, in which the plaintiff has no direct
evidence of discrimination and the employer disclaims reliance on the plaintiffs
disability for an employment decision. If the employer admits that the disability
played a prominent part in the decision, or the plaintiff has other direct evidence
of discrimination based on disability, the burden-shifting framework may be
unnecessary and inappropriate.
Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323 n.3 (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 1321. Additionally, plaintiff brought a claim under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213, claiming she was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. at 1321.
164. Id. at 1323.
165. Id. at 1325. In addressing the plaintiffs initial showing, the Tenth Circuit stated:
[P]laintiff's prima facie case consists of a showing that (1) she availed herself of a
protected right under the FMLA; (2) she was adversely affected by an
employment decision; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two
actions. [Plaintiff] has established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, in that
[defendant] sent her a letter of discipline concerning attendance problems on the
day she returned from the leave. However, as discussed above, [defendant] has
expressed the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason of excessive absenteeism and
[plaintiff] was not actually concerned about her attendance. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim.
Id.
166. Id. at 1324 (citation omitted).
167. See id. at 1324. The court noted that:
Pretext can be shown by "'such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons
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b. Seventh Circuit Forecloses Right to Use McDonnell Douglas
Approach to Claims Based on a Denial of a Substantive Right, but
Reserves Right to Decide if Approach Applies to Retaliation Claims
In Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp.,'68 the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged the general proposition that the FVILA supports two
distinct types of claims: claims based on the denial of a substantive right,
and claims based on retaliation.'69 Although the Seventh Circuit agreed
that the FMLA supported two causes of action, its method of analysis
differed from the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Morgan. In Diaz, where the
plaintiff framed his reinstatement claim as a denial of a substantive
right,'70 the court explicitly rejected the McDonnell Douglas approach
for claims pursued under the substantive right prong. 7' The Seventh
Circuit found that, for claims alleging the denial of a substantive right,
the issue is not whether the employee was "treated less favorably" but
whether the employer "respected each employee's entitlements."'' 72 The
circuit acknowledged the difference between anti-discrimination statutes
and statutes like the FMLA, which have substantive floors.'
71
for its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of
credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted
nondiscriminatory reasons."' Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947,
951-52 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)
(further citation omitted)). "Mere conjecture that [the] employer's explanation
is a pretext for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for denial of
summary judgment." Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772 (10th
Cir. 1988).
Id at 1323.
168. 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997).
169. Id. at 712-1.3.
170. Diaz was ultimately terminated for failing to comply with the second-opinion
process under 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c), causing him to move out from under the FMLA
umbrella and lose the protections. Id. at 713. However, it should be noted that the
Seventh Circuit misstates the statute surrounding the certification process in the Diaz
opinion. The panel stated that "[t]o establish the existence of such a [serious health]
condition an employee must submit medical certification." Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
In contrast, the statute states that "[a]n employer may require that a request for leave...
be supported by a certification issued by a health care provider.... ." 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a)
(1999) (emphasis added). An employee is only required to provide certification of a
"serious health condition" if the employer requests certification. Id. In such a case, the
employee "shall provide, in a timely manner, a copy of such certification to the employer."
Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.305 (2000).
171. Diaz, 131F.3d at 712-13.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 713. Regarding claims under the substantive prong of the FMLA, the court
stated:
A firm must honor statutory entitlements; when one employee sues, the firm may
not defend by saying that it treated all employees identically. The FMLA
requires an employer to accommodate rather than ignore particular
1106 [Vol. 50:1081
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In rejecting the burden-shifting analysis under substantive right
claims,174 the court recognized that the FMLA does contain an anti-
discrimination component, but dismissed its applicability in the matter at
hand because the complaint alleged a violation of a substantive right.'1
7
In this context, the Seventh Circuit reserved judgment on whether the
burden-shifting approach would apply to retaliation suits under the
FMLA 76 The court stated, however, that it would "continue to resolve
[retaliation] suits under the FMLA in the same direct way [as] in Price v.
Ft. Wayne,'7 7 by asking whether the plaintiff has established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to the benefit he
claims." 
78
c. Seventh Circuit Endorses Use of McDonnell Douglas Approach to
Retaliation Claims under the FMLA
After originally passing on the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas
approach, the Seventh Circuit followed the lead of other appellate
courts 179 in King v. Preferred Technical Group.8 ° The Seventh Circuit,
after a lengthy discussion about each of the potential causes of action
circumstances. In this respect the FMLA is like the [NLRA, and the ERISA], all
implemented without using the McDonnell Douglas approach. Applying rules
designed for anti-discrimination laws to statutes creating substantive entitlements
is apt to confuse, even if the adaptation is cleverly done.
Id. at 712.
174. Id. The circuit noted that "[t]he district court granted summary judgment to the
[defendant] after stepping through a series of questions inspired by McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green." Id. The court found that "[t]his [was] not a sound extension of
McDonnell Douglas." Id.
175. Id. at 713. The circuit noted that "Diaz does not say that he is a victim of
discrimination in this sense." Id.
176. Id. The circuit found that "[their] research has not turned up any appellate
decision applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to substantive claims under the
FMLA. At least one court of appeals has used a derivative burden-shifting approach for
claims based on the anti-retaliation provision of the FMLA, see Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108
F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997), and we reserve judgment on this possibility." Id.
177. See Price v. Ft. Wayne Foundry Corp., 117 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 1997) (vacating
summary judgment and remanding to determine if plaintiff suffered from a serious health
condition).
178. Diaz, 131 F.3d at 713.
179. See Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that "when there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework applies to claims that an employee was discriminated against for
availing himself of FMLA-protected rights"); see also Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323 (stating
that "the analytical framework first pronounced in McDonnell Douglas... guides our
review of the plaintiffs claims").
180. 166 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1999).
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under the FMLA,'8' acknowledged that the burden-shifting approach
should be applied to allegations of retaliatory discharge. 8 2 The court
recognized that, for retaliation claims, the McDonnell Douglas
framework made sense because of its broad application in the area of
discrimination. 'S
The court further stated that it found "no reason to treat an intent-
181. Id. at 891. The court's discussion, in its entirety, is as follows:
The FMLA establishes two categories of broad protections for employees.
First, the FMLA contains prescriptive protections that are expressed as
substantive statutory rights. The Act provides eligible employees of a covered
employer the right to take unpaid leave for a period of up to twelve work weeks
in any twelve-month period for a serious health condition as defined by the Act.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). After the period of qualified leave expires, the employee
is entitled to be reinstated to the former position or an equivalent one with the
same benefits and terms of employment that existed prior to the exercise of the
leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). To insure the availability of these guarantees, the
FMLA declares it "unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny
the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided." 29 U.S.C. §
2615(a)(1).
When an employee alleges a deprivation of these substantive guarantees, the
employee must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence only
entitlement to the disputed leave. In such cases, the intent of the employer is
immaterial. See Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 713 (7th
Cir.1997) ("We shall continue to resolve suits under the FMLA... by asking
whether the plaintiff has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
is entitled to the benefit he claims"); see also Hodgens v. General Dynamics
Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir.1998) ("Because the issue is the right to an
entitlement, the employee is due the benefit if the statutory requirements are
satisfied, regardless of the intent of the employer").
In addition to the substantive guarantees contemplated by the Act, the
FMLA also affords employees protection in the event they are discriminated
against for exercising their rights under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1-2).
Specifically, "[a]n employer is prohibited from discriminating against
employees.., who have used FMLA leave." 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).
Furthermore, an employer may not consider the taking of FMLA leave as a
negative factor in employment actions. Id. Because the FMLA's implementing
regulations bar certain discriminatory conduct, the protections contemplated by
these sections have been characterized as proscriptive in nature. See Hodgens,
144 F.3d at 160.
Id. at 891.
182. Id. By way of comparison, the Seventh Circuit stated:
In contrast to what an employee must show to establish a deprivation of a
substantive guarantee under the Act, when an employee raises the issue of
whether the employer discriminated against an employee by taking adverse
action against the employee for having exercised an FMLA right, the question of
intent is relevant. The issue becomes whether the employer's actions were
motivated by an impermissible retaliatory or discriminatory animus.
Id.
183. Id. at 891-92 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
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based FMLA claim, such as that raised by King, any differently than
other retaliatory discharge cases." '184 The court reiterated that in Diaz it
foreclosed the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis
when an employee alleged a deprivation of a substantive right under the
FMLA.
185
d. Confusion Regarding Reinstatement Claims Under the FMLA
Comes to Light: Eleventh Circuit Treats Plaintiffs Claim as Both a
Denial of a Substantive Right and Retaliation Claim
After the Seventh Circuit's ruling in King, other circuits followed suit
by adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework for FMLA
discrimination claims.'86 Finally, in O'Connor v. PCA Family Health
Plan, Inc. ,87 the tension between reinstatement claims and the dual
framework the courts had developed became apparent.
In O'Connor, the plaintiff became pregnant and notified her employer
that she intended to take maternity leave after the birth of her child.'88
After considering several options, plaintiff opted to take FMLA leave for
the period extending from April 22, 1996, to August 1, 1996. ' 89 While on
leave, defendants determined that economic conditions required them to
undergo a reduction-in-force (RIF).' 90 Upon completion of the final RIF
rosters, the employer removed two employees who were currently on
184. Id. at 892.
185. Id. at 892 n.1.
186. See Gleklen v. DCCC, Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding in a case
of first impression that the "McDonnell Douglas approach offers a coherent method of
evaluating" claims under the FMLA); see also Chaffin v. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316,
319 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that notwithstanding its prior reservation, they join their
"colleagues in other circuits, and hold that when direct evidence of discrimination is
lacking, the McDonnell Douglas organizational framework applies to claims that an
employee was penalized for exercising rights guaranteed by the FMLA"). The court was
careful to point out that its "holding does not extend to alleged deprivations of substantive
rights under the FMLA." Id. at 319 n.13. Cf Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2000)
(reserving judgment on whether the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test applies in
retaliatory discharge cases under the FMLA). In Hale, the court found "that Congress did
not have the authority to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states on claims arising
under the provisions at issue here. Its attempt to do so was not congruent or proportional
to the harms targeted by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 69.
187. 200 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2000).
188. Id. at 1351.
189. Id. Plaintiff's options included "FMLA leave, sick and vacation leave, short-term
disability leave, and leave without pay." Id. Ultimately, defendant designated the period
beginning April 18, 1996, as the beginning of her FMLA leave rather than allow plaintiff
to take personal leave for the period from April 18-21, 1996. Id. at 1351 n.1.
190. Id. at 1351.
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leave and held them for reassessment until they returned to work. 19'
However, due to an administrative error, the employer failed to remove
plaintiff's name from the RIF roster.'92 Upon detection of this oversight,
defendant orally offered to reinstate plaintiff to her former position. 9 3
Plaintiff refused the offer and brought an action in federal district
court. 1
94
Plaintiff's complaint failed to specify whether her claim was an
interference or retaliation claim, 9 ' but rather "asserted some nonspecific
violation of the FMLA."' 96 Although the complaint left the issue open,
the court construed O'Connor's claim to aver a retaliatory discharge.
197
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant regarding
the retaliation claim."" O'Connor appealed the district court's finding,
claiming that she had also properly pled an interference claim.' 99
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff presented both
types of claims, however, it also determined that she failed to appeal the
district court's ruling on the retaliation claim.2°°
Relying heavily on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Diaz,' the
plaintiff's appeal asserted was "that all FMLA rights, including
reinstatement, are absolute., 20 2  In distinguishing Diaz, the Eleventh
Circuit found that "[u]nlike the right to commence leave, an employer




194. Id. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida on July 23, 1996, alleging violations of the FMLA. Id. In October of
1996, plaintiff filed additional charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the Florida Commission on Human Relations alleging
discrimination based on gender, age, and pregnancy status in violation of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Id. Plaintiff received her Notice of Right to Sue
on August 18, 1997. Id. Plaintiff's original FMLA suit was adjudicated in a bench trial
before the district court on August 25, 1997. Id. On September 24, 1997, the court
announced its judgment that the defendant had not violated the FMLA. Id. In November
1997, plaintiff exercised her right to sue by filing a second action. Id. at 1351-52.
Defendants immediately moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the original
FMLA suit had res judicata effect. Id. at 1352. The district court granted the motion,
which was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 1351-52, 1356.
195. See supra note 18.
196. O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1352.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1352.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1353 n.10.
201. Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997).
202. O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1353.
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United States Department of Labor regulation qualifies the right., 203 To
support this proposition, the O'Connor majority cited the DOL
regulation, which stated that upon return "[a]n employee has no greater
right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment
than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA
leave period.,
20 4
Basing its opinion on the DOL regulation, the court held that when an
eligible employee claims she was not properly reinstated after FMLA
leave, the employer must be given an opportunity to show it would have
taken the same action even had the employee not taken FMLA leave.205
Further, the court noted that the defendant successfully put forth valid
reasons for the plaintiffs layoff, which the plaintiff never challenged.20 6
II. RICE v. SUNRISE EXPRESS, INC.: ADDING FURTHER
CONFUSION TO BURDEN ALLOCATION UNDER THE FMLA
By the time Rice reached Seventh Circuit, the courts were
unequivocally stating that claims under the FMLA would be analyzed
under the developed dual framework. However, the decision in
O'Connor signaled the beginning of the erosion of the dual framework; a
trend that continued in Rice.
A. The Rice Majority Holding
In Rice,2°7 the Seventh Circuit held that FMLA reinstatement claims
placed the ultimate burden of establishing the existence of a right on the
employee. 20 ' The issue in the case was whether the magistrate judge
erred in giving a jury instruction that placed the burden on the
defendants to show that the plaintiff would not have been retained,
203. Id. at 1354 (emphasis added) (citing Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1157
(7th Cir. 1997)). Inexplicably, the Eleventh Circuit went out of its way to distinguish
O'Connor from Diaz. In its opinion, the panel stated "[t]he Diaz plaintiff requested but
was denied his twelve weeks of leave for an alleged medical condition as authorized by 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), and the Seventh Circuit held the FMLA does not permit
employers to deny such a request, provided the employee follows proper procedure." Id.
However, the court later stated that "[w]e note that the Seventh Circuit ultimately held
that the plaintiff did not qualify for relief because he had not complied with his employer's
request for a second medical opinion, as is an employer's right under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 2613(c)." See id. at n.10 (citing Diaz, 131 F.3d at 713-14) (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 1354 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (1999)).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 209 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
208. Id. at 1018.
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despite her FMLA leave.2°9 In reversing the trial court's decision, the
Seventh Circuit found that the "structural and semantical relationship"
between the controlling provisions of the FMLA places the burden
directly on the employee.2t °
Writing for the majority,21' Judge Ripple, acknowledging Judge
Kanne's extensive discussion in King,1 2 discussed the two causes of
action available under the FMLA: (1) prescriptive protections expressed
209. Id. at 1016. The magistrate gave the following instruction:
To prove her claim that Sunrise violated the Family and Medical Leave Act
when they failed to reinstate her at the end of her leave, Sandra Rice must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements:
First that she qualified for a medical leave of absence under the FMLA.
However, the parties have stipulated this element as true, and therefore you shall
take it as having been proven.
Second, that when she attempted to return to work at the end of her FMLA
protected leave, Sunrise denied her the right to return to her former position or
an equivalent position. However, there is also no dispute that Sandra Rice was
laid off and, thus, not reinstated to her former position or an equivalent position
upon her attempted return from medical leave. She is not required to prove that
Sunrise intended to violate the FMLA; rather she need only show that Sunrise
failed to reinstate her at the end of her FMLA qualified leave.
Third, that she suffered damages as a direct result of the denial of
reinstatement. However, the FMLA gives Sandra Rice no greater right to
reinstatement or to other benefits that if she had continuously been employed
during her leave period. Thus, a defendant is entitled to seek to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that [the] employee would have been laid off
during the period of her FMLA leave, even if she had not taken such leave.
Accordingly, Sunrise claims that they did not reinstate Sandra Rice because
they had already eliminated her position when she was ready to return from her
medical leave on March 11, 1996. Therefore, it is Sunrise's burden to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Sandra Rice would have been laid off during
the period of her FMLA leave, even if she had not taken such leave.
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Sandra Rice would have
been laid off during the period of her leave, even if she had not taken such leave,
you must find in favor of Sunrise and return a verdict accordingly.
If you first find that she would have been laid off during the period of her
leave, even if she had not taken such leave, you are not permitted to second-
guess Sunrise's reasons for laying off Sandra Rice, even if you disagree with
them. However, if Sunrise has not proven that Sandra Rice would have been laid
off during the period of her leave, even if she had not taken such leave, you must
find in favor of Sandra Rice, determine the amount of damages to which she is
entitled, if any, and return a verdict accordingly.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rice v. Sunrise Express, No. 00-446, at 5 (U.S. filed 2000)
(citing Transcript of Jan. 7, 1998, at 145) (emphasis added to portion cited by Seventh
Circuit).
210. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
211. Id. at 1010. The panel consisted of Judges Frank H. Easterbrook (Chicago, IL),
Kenneth F. Ripple (South Bend, IN), and Terence T. Evans (Milwaukee, WI).
212. See supra note 181 (discussing the two potential causes of action under the
FMLA).
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as substantive rights, and (2) proscriptive provisions providing protection
from discrimination for exercising the rights granted under the FMLA.
213
The majority acknowledged that the right to reinstatement is contained
within the prescriptive (substantive rights) prong but found that the trial
court had misallocated the burden of proof.
214
The Rice majority recognized that employees who take leave under the
Act are entitled to be reinstated to the same or equivalent position.
21 5
However, the majority viewed this right through the prism of section
2614(a)(3)(B), which states that "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to entitle any restored employee to... any right, benefit, or
position of employment other than any right, benefit, or position to
which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not
taken the leave., 21 6 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit merged the two
provisions to create one right in which the employee must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to the benefit
claimed.21  This is similar to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
O'Connor, which recognized that an employer is entitled to deny the
right to reinstatement in certain circumstances. 2
Additionally, the Rice majority imposed the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting approach on claims alleging a denial of a substantive
right; an approach that had been reserved for retaliation claims.219 In
213. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1016-17.
214. Id. at 1017.
215. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1999).
216. Id. § 2614(a)(3)(B); see also Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
217. Rice, 209 F.3d at 101.8 (citing Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711,
713 (7th Cir. 1997)).
218. O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349,1354 (11th Cir. 2000).
219. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018. The Seventh Circuit wrote:
[T]he employee always bears the ultimate burden of establishing the right to the
benefit. If the employer wishes to claim that the benefit would not have been
available even if the employee had not taken the leave, the employer must
submit evidence to support that assertion. When that burden of going forward
has been met, however, the employee must ultimately convince the trier of fact,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that, despite the alternate characterization
offered by the employer, the benefit is one that falls within the ambit of section
2614(a)(1); the benefit is one that the employee would have received if leave had
not been taken. For instance, if the employer claims that the employee would
have been discharged or that the employee's position would have been
eliminated even if the employee had not taken the leave, the employee, in order
to establish the entitlement protected by § 2614(a)(1), must, in the course of
establishing the right, convince the trier of fact that the contrary evidence
submitted by the employer is insufficient and that the employee would not have
been discharged or his position would not have been eliminated if he had not
taken FMLA leave.
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Diaz, for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected a burden-shifting
approach under the substantive right prong because the issue was
whether the employer "respected each employee's entitlements., 220 Not
only did the Rice panel use an approach that resembles burden shifting, it
seemed to impose this approach at trial rather than at the dispositive
motion stage. 22' Accordingly, the Rice majority not only broke from its
prior opinions regarding the application of the McDonnell Douglas
approach 2  it also deviated from the DOL regulations and Supreme
Court jurisprudence that determined when the approach applies.223
The Rice majority rejected the view that the DOL regulation regarding
reinstatement was the final word regarding burden allocation. 22' The
court believed that the regulation, which places the burden on the
employer to show that the employment action would have been taken
regardless of the employee's FMLA leave, 5 did not allocate the
ultimate burden in the litigation context, but instead defined the
contours of the substantive right created by the FMLA.226 The majority
disregarded the Chevron227 principle when it failed to recognize the
affirmative defense established by the DOL.228
B. The Rice Dissent
Writing for the dissent, Judge Evans characterized the majority's
holding as simply misplacing the burden on the employee rather than the
220. Diaz, 131 F.3d at 712-1.3; see also King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d
887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming the finding in Diaz that the McDonnell Douglas
approach does not apply to claims of substantive statutory rights).
221. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting) (stating that the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework applies only during the dispositive motion phase of a
case).
222. See King, 166 F.3d at 891; Diaz, 131 F.3d at 712. The majority clarified that its
opinion did not clash with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in O'Connor. The majority
stated that:
O'Connor... does not state in any definitive fashion that the statutory text was
intended to alter the normal allocation of burdens of proof at trial, but simply
states that when an eligible employee who was on FMLA leave alleges her
employer denied her FMLA right to reinstatement, the employer has an
opportunity to demonstrate it would have discharged the employee even if she
had not been on FMLA leave.
Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018 (citing O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1354) (internal quotations omitted).
223. See supra note 53.
224. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
225. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1) (2001).
226. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
227. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); see
also supra note 53.
228. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
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employer.229 The dissent, acknowledging that the issue could be resolved
in more than one fashion, concluded that it would be better to require
the employer to manage the burden.23° In addition, Judge Evans
attacked the majority's suggestion that its ruling was consistent with
either the DOL regulations or its own decisions.23
The dissent asserted that the majority failed to give the DOL
regulations proper Chevron deference.232 The dissent argued that, when
a statute is ambiguous, we owe deference to the agency's interpretation if
it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.233 As such, the
dissent concluded that the DOL regulation placed the burden on the
employer and therefore created an affirmative defense.234
The dissenting opinion also provided several reasons for placing the
burden on employers in reinstatement claims under the FMLA. First,
the dissent pointed out that Congress was silent on the burden of proof
regarding claims under section 2614(a)(3)(B).235 Thus, the regulations
promulgated by the DOL under the authority of Congress, 6 which
created an affirmative defense, were reasonable and should have
received deference.237
Second, the dissent argued that "statutory entitlements" under the
FMLA should be treated similar to those under other employment
statutes.2 As recognized by the dissent, the NLRA, the FLSA, and the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) are structured
so that the employer bears the burden of proving that a provision does
not apply to them. 9
Finally, the dissent opted for a pragmatic approach. It argued that it is
229. Id. at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
231. See id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
232. See id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The dissent went on to point out that Chevron
deference applies to regulations of the DOL. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting) (citing Thorson v.
Gemini Inc., 205 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 2000) (explicitly giving Chevron deference to the DOL
in its interpretation of "serious health condition" under the FMLA); and Price v. Fort
Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 1997) (relying on FMLA regulations to interpret the
phrase "serious health condition" with no explicit discussion of Chevron principles)).
234. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
236. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1999).
237. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393
(1983)); see also Corning Glass v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (the Equal Pay Act);
Sutton v. Engineered Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1979) (the FLSA).
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sensible to make the employer shoulder the burden of proof.24° The
dissent pointed out that in such cases the employer is generally in control
of the evidence.2 4' The dissent concluded that "the majority here has
allowed a McDonnell Douglas-style analysis to cast too dark a shadow
over its view of this case.
'2 42
C. The Rice en banc Dissent
243
Writing for the dissent in the decision denying rehearing en banc,
Judge Wood followed an approach similar to that of the panel dissent.
244
Judge Wood believed that although the majority came to a valid
conclusion, the Evans' dissent stood on firmer ground.245
First, the en banc dissent argued that the majority does not give proper
deference to the DOL's regulations.246 It argued that the DOL's
regulations are consistent with the FMLA's statutory framework, which
supports the proposition that sections 2614(a)(1) and (3) create an
affirmative defense. 7 Judge Wood found that the majority's opinion
failed because it turned the inquiry into a "unitary one," forcing the
employee to "prove both the right to reinstatement and show that the
employer's assertion that the right would have been lost anyway was
wrong.
,2 48
Second, the en banc dissent argued that practical considerations must
be considered when determining the proper allocation of burdens under
the FMLA.24 9 The dissent noted, that the party with the best access to
information should bear the burdens of production and persuasion.50
240. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting).
241. Id. (Evans, J. dissenting). The dissent notes that in discrimination cases:
[T]he employer has to produce evidence that there was a legitimate reason for
the employment action and the employee must show that the reason given is
pretextual. However, the dissent points out further that even in discrimination
cases, the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply at trial.
Id. (Evans, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
242. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
243. On June 23,2000, the Seventh Circuit denied a rehearing en banc by a vote of 8 to
3. Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 217 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Interestingly,
Judge Evans who penned the dissent in the panel hearing did not join Judge Woods'
dissent encouraging the rehearing. Id. at 493 (Wood, J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). Judges Ilana Diamond Rovner and Ann Claire
Williams joined Judge Diane P. Wood's dissent. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 493-94 (Wood, J., dissenting).
247. See id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 493 (Wood, J., dissenting).
249. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
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III. RICE V. SUNRISE EXPRESS, INC.: UNCERTAINTY
REGARDING THE PROPER ALLOCATION OF BURDENS
UNDER THE FMLA
The problems the federal courts currently face with how to treat
reinstatement claims under the FMLA, resemble the struggles faced
when attempting to articulate the test for NLRA "mixed motive"
cases. 2  Until the Court's decision in Transportation Management
Corp.,252 the circuits were split on the issue of treating the employer's
burden to proffer a valid justification as an affirmative defense or as
burden shifting.2"3 Ultimately, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
the NLRB's characterization of the statute as supporting an affirmative
defense was proper.5 4 It is becoming apparent, however, that the courts
are ignoring the independent affirmative defense for reinstatement





251. MARCHETrA, supra note 133 (providing a thorough discussion of the evolution of
mixed motive jurisprudence). A "mixed motive" case arises when the employee's claim of
unlawful motive and the employer's justification both have merit. Id. at 280.
252. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); see also supra notes 132-45
and accompanying discussion.
253. See MARCHETrA, supra note 133, at 280-81.
254. See Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 401 ("We are quite sure, however, that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that section 10(c) forbids placing the burden on the
employer to prove that absent the improper motivation he would have acted in the same
manner for wholly legitimate reasons."); see also MARCHEMrA, supra note 133, at 280.
255. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1012 (2000); O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th
Cir. 2000); Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1997). In Diaz,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the trial court's approach that explicitly applied the
McDonnell Douglas approach to a claim alleging a denial of a substantive right. Diaz, 131
F.3d at 712. The Seventh Circuit stated:
Applying rules designed for anti-discrimination laws to statutes creating
substantive entitlements is apt to confuse, even if the adaptation is cleverly done.
The district court's approach shows what can go wrong. The judge stated the
inquiry this way:
Under the burden shifting approach, Diaz must initially establish a pima
facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) he was protected under the
FMLA; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) he was
treated less favorably than employees who did not avail themselves of the
act or that the adverse decision was a result of his invocation of the act. If
Diaz is successful in establishing a prima facie case, "the burden of
production then shifts to the Foundry to show a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action...." If the
Foundry produces a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts
back to Diaz to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons
offered are a pretext for discrimination.
This is not a sound extension of McDonnell Douglas.
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The courts are currently struggling with how to treat reinstatement
claims under the FMLA because, although the courts have typically
identified reinstatement as a substantive right,"' these types of claims
invariably have some element of motive attached to them.257 Because
reinstatement claims inevitably arise out of circumstances occurring
while the employee is on leave it remains difficult for the courts to
differentiate the substantive component from the retaliatory one.
258
Because of this ambiguity, the courts are inching towards applying the
McDonnell Douglas approach to reinstatement claims.2 " However, the
rigid dual framework developed by the courts, as well as the DOL
regulations, constrain the courts' ability to do this in any formal fashion.
A. Courts Are Deviating From the Strict Dual Framework They
Developed Under the FMLA: The Seventh Circuit Picks Up Where the
Eleventh Circuit Left Off In O'Connor
Although the courts have paid lip service to the proposition that the
burden-shifting approach does not apply to substantive rights under the
FMLA, the Rice majority allowed a McDonnell Douglas-style analysis to
seep into an area that had been viewed as a substantive right:
reinstatement.2 0 Indeed, the majority used an approach resembling the
McDonnell Douglas framework, which moved the court toward applying
a single method of analysis for all reinstatement claims under the FMLA.
This method cannot be reconciled with DOL regulations establishing an
independent affirmative defense.
The source of much of the confusion surrounding reinstatement claims
under the FMLA stems from the parties' inability to clearly plead
reinstatement claims, and the courts' further inability to discern intent.
26
'
The problem arises from cases with nearly identical facts, which can be
treated as either a denial of a substantive right,"262 retaliation,263 or
Id. (citation omitted).
256. See supra note 30.
257. See infra notes 313-24.
258. See infra notes 261-67.
259. See infra notes 284-88.
260. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting) (questioning the majority's use
of burden-shifting for reinstatement claims, especially because the court foreclosed the
McDonnell Douglas approach for cases not involving discrimination in Diaz).
261. See, e.g., O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th
Cir. 2000).
262. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1011 (considering a suit brought under 29 U.S.C. §
2614(a)(1) for failure to reinstate).
263. See King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999)
(considering a case where the plaintiff alleged that she was terminated because she took
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both, 64 depending on the form and content of the pleading and the way
the court decides to view it. For instance, in Morgan v. Hilti, Inc.,265
where the employer terminated plaintiff upon returning from FMLA
leave, the plaintiff brought a retaliation claim.66 On the other hand, in
Rice, where the employer terminated the plaintiff while she was on leave,
the plaintiff brought a claim against the employer for failure to
reinstate.26 7
In O'Connor,268  the Eleventh Circuit treated the set of facts
surrounding plaintiff's claim as both an interference and retaliation
claim. 269 The plaintiff opted to take FMLA leave after learning that she
was pregnant.270  Because plaintiff's complaint failed to specifically
identify her FMLA claim as either a denial of a substantive right or a
retaliation claim, the district court treated plaintiff's claim as only
alleging a retaliatory cause of action.271' After the district court dismissed
plaintiff's complaint on summary judgment, plaintiff appealed, claiming
that her complaint also stated a viable interference claim.272  The
Eleventh Circuit found that the pleading supported an interference claim
as well, but also dismissed this claim on summary judgment. 3
Appropriately, the court recognized that an employee's right to
reinstatement is limited in certain circumstances.274
In dealing with the plaintiff's remaining interference claim, the
Eleventh Circuit used a method of analysis that resembled the
McDonnell Douglas approach.275 In analyzing the plaintiff's interference
FMLA leave); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (claiming that
employment action was taken because plaintiff took FMLA leave).
264. See O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1352.
265. 108 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997).
266. Id. at 1322-23.
267. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1011. Rice originally asserted claims under both causes of action
but the retaliation action was not argued before the jury. Although there is some dispute
as to how the claim actually dropped out, the plaintiff claims that "Rice herself decided
not to argue her discrimination claim to the jury, primarily to avoid confusion to the jury
on the burden of proof issue." Appellee's Brief, Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., Nos. 97-3982
& 98-2195, at 13 n.5 (7th Cir. filed Mar. 19, 1999).
268. 200 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2000).
269. Id. at 1352; see also supra note 195 and accompanying discussion.
270. O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1351.
271. Id. at 1352.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1356 (affirming judgment of the district court).
274. Id. at 1354 (recognizing that employers are entitled to deny reinstatement in
certain circumstances).
275. See id. at 1353. The Eleventh Circuit stated:
Although we find O'Connor presented both claims to the district court, she does
not appeal the district court's analysis of the retaliation claim, to which it applied
20011 1119
Catholic University Law Review
claim, the Eleventh Circuit held:
[W]hen an "eligible employee" who was on FMLA leave
alleges her employer denied her FMLA right to reinstatement,
the employer has an opportunity to demonstrate it would have
discharged the employee even had she not been on FMLA
leave. The district court found that [the defendant/employer]
slated [plaintiff/employee] for termination... as part of its first
phase of [a reduction in force], the legitimacy of which
[plaintiff] has never challenged.276
Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized that other courts refused to
apply the McDonnell Douglas approach to interference-type claims, in
effect the court applied a burden-shifting approach. 7  First, the court
permitted an eligible employee to show she was denied reinstatement, 78
which resembles the McDonnell Douglas approach's prima facie showing
that the plaintiff qualified for the benefits in dispute.27 9  Next, the
employer was permitted to demonstrate that it would have taken the
action irrespective of the employee's FMLA leave,280 which mirrors the
employer's "burden of production" of a legitimate reason for the
rejection of these benefits. 21 Finally, the court stated that the plaintiff
12never challenged "the legitimacy" of the defendant's justification. In
other words, the plaintiff never claimed that the reason offered was
pretextual, which is the final prong under the McDonnell Douglas
approach.283
Like the Eleventh Circuit in O'Connor, the Seventh Circuit majority in
the burden-shifting approach outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, and
common to employment discrimination claims. She has therefore abandoned the
issue. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th
Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1353 n.10.
276. Id. at 1354.
277. Id. at 1353 (citing Dia v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712-14 (7th
Cir. 1997); Hubbard v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Assoc., I F. Supp. 2d 867, 874-75 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (applying Diaz); Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 996-97 (N.D.
Ga. 1996); see also supra notes 99-122 and accompanying text (discussing the approach);
cf. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1998) (recognizing
interference claims and citing Diaz).
278. O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1354.
279. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
280. O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1354.
281. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
282. O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1354.
283. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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Rice also applied an approach similar to that used in McDonnell
Douglas, despite its earlier statement that the test did not apply in the
circumstances.28 The majority in Rice analyzed the reinstatement claims
as follows:
The plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he is entitled to the benefit that he claims .... If the
employer wishes to claim that the benefit would not have been
available even if the employee had not taken leave, the
employer must submit evidence to support that assertion.
When that burden of going forward has been met, however, the
employee must ultimately convince the trier of fact, by a
preponderance of the evidence that... the benefit is one that
falls within the ambit of section 2614(a)(1); the benefit is one
that the employee would have received if leave had not been
taken.285
Judge Evans' dissent recognized that the exchange by the majority
bears resemblance to the three-step McDonnell Douglas approach.28
284. See supra note 219.
285. Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008. 1018 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1012 (2000) (emphasis added).
286. Id. at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting). This confusion in the majority's opinion is
apparent in the recent decision in Ogborn v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local
No. 881, No. 98 C 4623, 2000 WL 1409855 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2000). In Ogborn, the
plaintiff brought a failure to reinstate claim under the FMILA. Id. at *1. The court noted
that the plaintiff conceded that he was "not claiming retaliation for having taken [FMLA
leave]." Id. at *8. The court explicitly acknowledged that the plaintiffs claim should not
be analyzed under the retaliation prong of the dual framework, and proceeded to apply a
variation of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach. Id. at *9. The district
court stated:
In such situations, an employee claiming denial of the substantive right to 12
weeks leave and/or the substantive right to return to work has the burden of
persuasion in showing that he or she would not have been discharged absent
taking the FMLA leave. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019. The employer need only meet
the burden of production of asserting an alternative reason for the discharge. Id.
[P]laintiff argues that the evidence shows that his alleged failure to
adequately process grievances was not the actual reason for his discharge. This
argument will be considered in determining whether plaintiff has satisfied his
burden of showing that a genuine factual dispute exists regarding whether he
would not have been discharged (and thus not denied his FMLA rights to 12
weeks leave and a return to his position) had he not taken leave.
The Local has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's
discharge. The question is whether, on the evidence before the court, a genuine
factual dispute exists as to whether this was the actual reason for plaintiff's
discharge or instead a pretext. To show that an employer's stated ground for an
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Rather than characterizing the Eleventh Circuit's approach as a variant
of the McDonnell Douglas approach, the Seventh Circuit professed that
O'Connor "[did] not state in any definitive fashion that the statutory text
was intended to alter the normal allocation of burdens of proof at
trial .... 287  However, not only did the Seventh Circuit misapply the
McDonnell Douglas approach to reinstatement claims under the FMiLA,
they also stated that the approach applies at trial rather than at the
summary judgment phase. 88
Contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters 9 the Seventh Circuit imposed a McDonnell Douglas-
type test at the trial stage when it reversed and remanded Rice to the trial
court with instructions to apply a similar approach. In Furnco, the
Court stated that the McDonnell Douglas approach is only used in the
initial stages of litigation, which is why the employer only retains a
burden of production regarding a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employment action.29 ' The Rice dissent recognized that the
McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply at trial in discrimination
cases. 92 In O'Connor, the Eleventh Circuit, in misapplying the
McDonnell Douglas approach, confined its use of the test to the
293
summary judgment phase of the litigation .
Had the Seventh Circuit majority, when describing the employer's
adverse employment action is pretextual, a plaintiff generally must present either
direct evidence that an illegitimate ground was a motivating factor in the
employer's decision or present a material factual dispute as to the sincerity of the
proffered reason. (citations omitted).
Id. at *9-10 (emphasis added). In Ogborn, the trial court not only applied approaches
similar to that employed in Rice and O'Connor, it also used the McDonnell Douglas
nomenclature, such as "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and "pretext." Id. at *10;
see also supra notes 99-101. This approach mirrors the approach taken by the trial court in
Diaz, which the Seventh Circuit later overruled. See Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp.,
131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1999). But see Bachelder v. America West Airlines, No. 99-
17458, 2001 WL 883701, at *12 n.10 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) (identifying that the source of
courts' confusion is the inappropriate use of the word "discriminate").
287. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
288. Id. at 1019 (reversing and remanding for proceedings consistent with majority's
opinion). Contra Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting) (stating that the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework applies only during the dispositive motion phase of a
case and not at trial).
289. 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
290. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018-19.
291. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578.
292. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting) (citing Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711 (1983)).
293. O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, 200 F.3d 1349, 1353-55 (11th Cir. 2000)
(applying burden-shifting approach to affirm district court's grant of summary judgment).
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burden under FMLA reinstatement claims, used the term "burden of
proving," rather than merely the "burden of going forward, 294 their
approach would have been consistent with the model developed under
Transportation Management Corp.,2 as well as the DOL regulations.299
Instead, the majority's use of the term "burden of going forward" steered
the court towards an improper application of the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting approach.
B. Section 2614(A)(3) Supports The Interpretation That It Is Both A
Limitation And The Source Of An Affirmative Defense
As in O'Connor, where the court recognized that the right to
reinstatement is limited, 7 the majority in Rice reached the same
conclusion regarding the effect of the language in section 2614(a)(3) on
the right to reinstatement granted under section 2614(a)(1).2 9 8 The Rice
majority, however, failed to acknowledge the independent affirmative
defense established by the DOL regulations.
On the other hand, the Rice dissent properly recognized that the
DOL's interpretation of section 2614(a)(3) created an affirmative
defense.299 Despite this, the dissent failed to recognize that the source of
the affirmative defense was the DOL regulation and not the statutory
language of section 2614(a)(3), and that even under an affirmative
defense, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.
Both opinions failed to recognize that the two positions are not
mutually exclusive; the language in section 2614(a)(3) can support the
limitation on the employee's right to reinstatement while allowing the
employer an independent affirmative defense consistent with the DOL
regulation.
294. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
295. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text. In relying on Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), the courts have carefully distinguished between
the "burden of going forward," also known as the burden of production, and the "burden
of persuasion." See, e.g., Schaeff, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 113 F.3d 264, 266-67 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
("holding that the General Counsel has only the burden of going forward with evidence of
discrimination and does not retain the burden of persuasion throughout the proceeding");
Southwest Merch. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 53 F.3d 1334, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Transp.
Mgmt. Corp., 462 US at 403-04 ("determines only the burden of going forward, not the
burden of persuasion"). The fact that the majority made no effort to address the dissent's
concern that the majority's approach ignored the affirmative defense supports the notion
that this was more than careless drafting.
296. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (2001); see also supra note 87.
297. O'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1354.
298. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018.
299. Id. at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting).
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1. Section 2614(a) (3) Creates An Express Limitation to the Right to
Reinstatement Under the FMLA
The Rice majority pointed out that the structure of the FMLA
supports the proposition that section 2614(a)(3) should be read as a
limitation on the right to reinstatement."' The majority stated that the
language in section 2614(a)(3) "sets more precise contours on [the] right
[to reinstatement] by placing limitations on that right."3 °' On its face, the
statute's language is contained in a section that is captioned
"[l]imitations."30 2  As the majority points out, the "structural and
semantical relationship [of section 2614(a)(3)] to section 2614(a)(1), is
best read as a rule of construction that affects the meaning of section
2614(a)(1) by excluding [rights the employee would not have been
entitled to] from the substantive right" of reinstatement.30
3
The dissent improperly labels the language in section 2614(a)(3) as an
"exemption." For example, section 213 of the FLSA explicitly provides
exemptions, such as the "bona fide executive status," to the overtime
provisions 4.3 " The structure of the FMLA does not support reading the
language contained in section 2614(a)(3) as an exemption.
2. The DOL's Regulation Creating an Affirmative Defense is a
Permissible Construction Under the Statute
The dissent appropriately stated that the DOL's "interpretation of
300. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1017-18.
301. Id. at 1017. In its brief, appellant argued that it is "clear from both the wording
and structure of [29 U.S.C.] § 2614 that the proviso regarding 'any benefit or position...
to which the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave,'
was not intended by Congress to be an affirmative defense, but instead, was intended to be
a limitation on the right conferred." Appellant's Joint Consolidated Brief, Rice v. Sunrise
Express, Nos. 97-3982 & 98-2195, at 24 (7th Cir. filed Feb. 17, 1998) (emphasis in original).
302. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3) (1999).
303. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018 (citations omitted). Defendant argued that "from general
rules of statutory construction, that the limitation is to be regarded as a 'condition
precedent,' i.e., an element of proof, as opposed to 'condition subsequent,' i.e., an
affirmative defense." See Appellant's Joint Consolidated Brief, Rice v. Sunrise Express,
Nos. 97-3982 & 98-2195, at 24 (7th Cir. filed Feb. 17, 1998). To support this proposition,
defendants rely on the following principle:
The general rule is that limitations placed upon a liability treated by statute
become part of the right conferred and that to warrant a recovery under a statute
which creates a liability, or gives a remedy, which did not exist before, the case
must be brought within the terms of the statute. Provisos and exceptions in
statutes granting a cause of action create a limitation on the right to sue and are
to be regarded as conditions precedent.
Id. (citing 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 435, at 532 (1974)) (emphasis added in brief).
304. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1999) (overtime provisions do not apply to "any employee
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity... ").
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section 2614(a)(3)(B) is entirely reasonable.""3 ° However, the dissent
failed to recognize two important facets of the affirmative defense. First,
the DOL regulation, and not the statutory language, created the
affirmative defense." 6 Second, regardless of the defendant's ability to
assert an affirmative defense, the plaintiff always carries the ultimate
burden of persuasion regarding his claim.3"7
In Transportation Management Corp., the Supreme Court found that
the First Circuit erred in holding that section 10(c)3 8 of the NLRA
forbids the NLRB from creating an affirmative defense. 309 Notably, the
305. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting).
306. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393,404-03 (1983).
307. Id.
308. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1999). Section 10(c) states:
The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the Board shall be
reduced to writing and filed with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the
Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the
preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any
person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair
labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this [Act]: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of
an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: And
provided further, That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a
violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of section 158 of this title, and in deciding
such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of
whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor
organization national or international in scope. Such order may further require
such person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has
complied with the order. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the
Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall
state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint.
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an
employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. In case the
evidence is presented before a member of the Board, or before an administrative
law judge or judges thereof, such member, or such judge or judges as the case
may be, shall issue and cause to be served on the parties to the proceeding a
proposed report, together with a recommended order, which shall be filed with
the Board, and if no exceptions are filed within twenty days after service thereof
upon such parties, or within such further period as the Board may authorize, such
recommended order shall become the order of the Board and become effective
as therein prescribed.
Id. (emphasis added).
309. See Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 401-03. In its discussion, the Court stated
that:
The General Counsel has the burden of proving these elements under section
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source of the independent affirmative defense was the NLRB's practice
and interpretation and not the statute."0  Similarly, under the FMLA,
the DOL chose to create an independent affirmative defense rooted in
the language of section 2614(a)(3).
By disregarding the Chevron principle, the Rice majority ignored the
DOL's construction creating an independent affirmative defense. As
Judge Evans' dissent noted, when a statute is not clear on its face, courts
owe deference to the interpretation by an agency charged with enforcing
it if that interpretation is permissible. 1' Instead, the majority found that
the regulation is best understood as defining the boundaries of the
substantive right and not as placing the burden in litigation. 12
The majority's opinion failed to address and give application to
Chevron. Additionally, the majority failed to discuss the dissent's
assertion that proper Chevron deference was not given to the DOL
regulation. This omission further enforces the notion that the majority
disregarded the traditional notions of deference outlined in Chevron.
10(c). But the Board's construction of the statute permits an employer to avoid
being adjudicated a violator by showing what his actions would have been
regardless of his forbidden motivation. It extends to the employer what the
Board considers to be an affirmative defense but does not change or add to the
elements of the unfair labor practice that the General Counsel has the burden of
proving under section 10(c). We assume that the Board could reasonably have
construed the Act in the manner insisted on by the Court of Appeals. We also
assume that the Board might have considered a showing by the employer that the
adverse action would have occurred in any event as not obviating a violation
adjudication but as going only to the permissible remedy, in which event the
burden of proof could surely have been put on the employer. The Board has
instead chosen to recognize, as it insists it has done for many years, what it
designates as an affirmative defense that the employer has the burden of
sustaining. We are unprepared to hold that this is an impermissible construction
of the Act. The Board's construction here, while it may not be required by the
Act, is at least permissible under it... , and in these circumstances its position is
entitled to deference.
Id. at 401-02 (citations omitted and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 401.
311. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d at 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1012 (2000) (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984)).
312. Id. at 1018. The court stated:
Read as a whole and in the context of the entire regulatory scheme, we think that
this regulation is best understood not as the agency's understanding as to
Congress' allocation of the ultimate burden of proof in the litigation context, but
as an explanation of the nature of the substantive right created by the statute.
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C. Although Reinstatement Claims Under the FMLA Are Difficult to
Differentiate From Retaliation Claims, The Statute Supports Both Causes
of Action
Like the FMLA, the FLSA supports two distinct causes of action:
denial of substantive rights and retaliation. If an employee brings an
action claiming a deprivation of overtime pay, as in Sutton v. Engineered
Systems, Inc.,313 the employer is entitled to assert that the employee falls
under one or more of the exemptions listed in section 13 of the FLSA.314
The employer's showing ,in such an FLSA action, has been interpreted
as an affirmative defense.315 On the other hand, if an employee is
subjected to an adverse employment action after exercising rights under
the FLSA then the employee is entitled to bring a retaliation claim under
the FLSA.316 FLSA retaliation claims are analyzed using the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting approach. 17
The affirmative defense approach, employed under the overtime
provisions of the FLSA, is consistent with the approach employed by
courts under the FMLA for allegations of substantive rights violations.
An employee's entitlement to overtime under the FLSA is akin to the
FMLA's substantive rights such as the ability to commence leave, the
extension of health benefits during leave, and the right to
reinstatement.318  If an employer contends that an employee is not
entitled to take FMLA leave, then the employer has the burden to
demonstrate that the employee was not entitled to such benefit.
Conversely, retaliation claims under the FMLA and FLSA are
analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas approach at the summary
judgment stage.3 9 For example, if an employee makes a retaliation claim
under the FLSA, the courts will apply the three-step burden-shifting
approach.3 20 Likewise, an employee's retaliation claim under the FMLA
will be subject to the McDonnell Douglas approach.321
The courts have held that, regardless of the merits of an employee's
overtime claim under the FLSA, a retaliation claim will survive the
313. 598 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1979); see also notes 150-55.
314. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1999); see also supra note 154.
315. See supra notes 153 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 156.
317. See supra note 157.
318. See supra notes 8-15.
319. See supra notes 158 & 204 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir. 1997).
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adverse employment action if there is causation.322 Courts are able to do
this because it is possible to conceptually sever the two causes of action
under the FLSA. Presumably, courts should be able to do the same thing
under the FMLA. For example, if an employee requests leave but is
denied, only later to be demoted by the employer, then both causes of
action could be made and distinguished.3 23  Regardless of whether an
employee has the minimum number of hours to qualify to sustain the
substantive claim, the retaliation claim could be sustained if the
employee is able to show causation between the claim and the adverse
action.
The problem with reinstatement claims under the FMLA is that they
cannot be as neatly severed into their substantive and retaliatory
components as under the FLSA.32"  Although several courts, including
the Seventh Circuit, found it difficult to decouple the two causes of
action, it is important to realize that the two causes of action can and
should be distinguished.
322. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth
Circuit stated:
[Defendant] argues that there was no evidence to establish that IMC terminated
Nero in retaliation for his request for leave under the FMLA. This arguments
reflects a misunderstanding of Nero's claim. We have explained that the FMLA
contains two distinct provisions. See Bocalbos v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 162
F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Hodges v. General Dynamics Corp., 144
F.3d 151,159-60 (1st Cir. 1998); Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711,
712-13 (7th Cir. 1997). The first type of provision creates a series of entitlements
or substantive rights. An employee's right to return to the same position after a
qualified absence falls under this category. See Bocalbos, 162 F.3d at 383. An
employer must honor entitlements, and cannot defend by arguing that it treated
all employees identically. See Diaz, 131 F.3d at 712. 'Because the issue is the
right to an entitlement, the employee is due the benefit if the statutory
requirements are satisfied, regardless of the intent of the employer.' Hodgens,
144 F.3d at 159. The second type of provision is proscriptive, and protects
employees from retaliation or discrimination for exercising their rights under the
FMLA. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (1997) ("An employer is
prohibited from discriminating against employees.., who have used FMLA
leave."). Nero argued repeatedly and clarified at trial that he is "not saying he
got fired because of taking the leave." Rather, Nero argued consistently
throughout trial that "the crux of the claim [is that] he wasn't restored" to his job.
IMC continues to argue at length, however, against a theory that Nero repeatedly
disavowed. Declining to consider further IMC's immaterial argument, we
conclude that the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences from it,
viewed in a light most favorable to Nero, sufficiently support the jury's verdict
that IMC violated the FMLA.
Id. at 926-27.
324. See, e.g., O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc. 200 F.3d 1349, 1352, 1353
n.10 (11th Cir. 2000); see also supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since its inception in 1993, courts have struggled with the proper
allocation of burdens under the FMLA. This struggle is evident in the
courts' handling of reinstatement claims. The courts established a dual
framework to handle both types of claims that arise under the FMLA:
denial of substantive rights and retaliation. A problem arises, however,
because reinstatement claims under the FMLA draw in elements from
both types of claims and such claims can be difficult to distinguish.
The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc.
exemplifies this difficulty. Although the decision properly found that the
language in section 2614(a)(3) acted as a limitation on the right to
reinstatement, it failed to properly assign the burdens of proof for
reinstatement claims. The majority's principle failure was in their
disregard of Chevron deference to the DOL regulation that established
an independent affirmative defense. In failing to recognize the
affirmative defense, the majority instead applied a variant of the
McDonnell Douglas approach to reinstatement claims under the FMLA;
an approach that the Seventh Circuit explicitly foreclosed in their earlier
decision in Diaz. This decision continued the trend, which began in the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in O'Connor, applying a McDonnell Douglas-
type approach without acknowledging it as such.
The dissenting opinion in Rice appropriately recognized that section
2614(a)(3) of the FMLA supported an affirmative defense. However,
the dissent's opinion failed to recognize that the source of the affirmative
defense was the DOL regulation and not the statute itself. The dissent
also failed to recognize that even under an affirmative defense model,
the plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.
Both opinions failed to recognize that the statutory language of section
2614(a)(3) supports the notion that it is both a limitation and the source
of the DOL's affirmative defense. Consequently, the decision in Rice
establishes a scheme of analysis that erodes the dual framework that the
courts have set forth and adds to the confusion that has developed.
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